# A HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE

JEAN-MARIE VERPOORTEN

# MĪMĀṂSĀ LITERATURE

OTTO HARRASSOWITZ · WIESBADEN

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# PREFACE

This publication is a modest attempt to collect the data concerning the *Mīmāṃsā* from books and papers published over half a century, and to give an up-to-date summary of them.

Further investigation is required concerning many authors, who, although important, so far remain mere names.

I trust that this research will help to revive interest in the *Mīmāṃsā* and in the pandits who, all over India, keep up this noble tradition.

I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Gonda who accepted my collaboration, and also to those scholars who allowed me to derive benefit from their erudition.

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

K = Kumārila
*M* = *Mīmāṃsā*
*MK* = *Mīmāṃsākoṣa* (§ 65/3)
MM = Maṇḍana Miśra
*MS* = *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*
Pr = Prabhākara
PSM = Pārthasārathi Miśra
Ś = Śabara
*ŚB* = *Śābara-bhāṣya*
ŚN = Śālikanātha
*ŚV* = *Ślokavārttika*

# THE MĪMĀṂSĀ

## INTRODUCTION

§ 1. Etymologically, the feminine name *mīmāṃsā* is a derivative with the primary suffix *-ā* from the base *mīmāṃs,* the desiderative (and also intensive) of *man-* "to think." It thus means "effort to intense reflexion", but also "enquiry, theoretical discussion (sometimes opposed to practice)."

*Mīmāṃsā (M)* is also called a. *Karma-mīmāṃsā* "Action-enquiry" or *Karma-kāṇḍa* "Action-chapter," because it explores the way of (ritual) action (as distinct from the way of knowledge) towards "Liberation" *(mokṣa).* b. *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* "Former *M*," because the way of action is preceding and preparing the way of knowledge, that is the *Vedānta* or *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* "Later *M*."[1]

The term *mīmāṃsaka* denotes a person well-versed in *M*. In some documents, such as *Āpastamba-dharmasūtra,* the synonym *nyāyavid* is to be found.

§ 2. Philosophically, the *M* is one of the six "viewpoints" *(darśana)* acknowledged by the Indian thinkers. Originally it has been an exegesis of certain phrases taken out of the Vedic ritual treatises, especially the mandatory sentences. Later on and from this background, the *M* came to develop conceptions of its own in four main areas:

1. the factual description of the liturgical actions through the sentences expressing it:[2] what are their components, the relative importance and the sphere of influence of each of them? Such an approach is obvious in the *Śābara-bhāṣya* (below §§ 13ff.) or in the *Āpadevī* (§ 61B).
2. the analysis of the words and phrases expressing the sacrificial injunctions and performances, with a constant to and fro between terms and objects.
3. the investigation into the nature of the word and the sentence in general.
4. the epistemological survey of the sources of knowledge, right or wrong, particularly in Kumārila and Prabhākara.

In comparison with these aspects, the religious and moral views are hardly emphasized by the *M*.

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[1] Further denominations in JHĀ 1983a[2]: Introd. I; another interpretation, PARPOLA 1981: 145–146.

[2] On that point, see JHĀ 1983a[2]: Introd. XIII–XIV.

## CHAPTER I: PREHISTORY OF THE MĪMĀṂSĀ

§ 3. The use of the words *mīmāṃsate/mīmāṃsā* can be traced back to the Vedic period. In the *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* (oral composition 750 B. C.?), 7, 5, 7, 1 it is said: "The expounders of the Brahman discuss *(mīmāṃsante)* whether (a day at the *gavāmayana* sacrifice) should be left out or not."[3] See also *Aitareyabrāhmaṇa* (or. comp. 650 B. C.?), 4, 47, 9: *mīmāṃsānāḥ* "investigating;" *Taittirīya-āraṇyaka* 8, 8, 2; *Kena-upaniṣad* 2, 1 and so on.

In his *Mahābhāṣya,* Patañjali (150 B. C.?) not only knows the words *mīmāṃsā* (ed. Kielhorn II, 206, 8 = 249, 17 = 325, 14) and *mīmāṃsaka* (ed. K. I, 239, 11), but also an individual treatise of *M* called *Kāśakṛtsnī.*[4]

§ 4. The fact that the background of the *MS* is a Vedic one is borne out by the close parallelism between some of them and sections of the *Śrauta-* and *Dharma-sūtras* (8th–4th cc. B. C.). This is a set of passages echoing each other.[5]

*Āpastamba-śrautasūtra* (500 B. C.?) 14, 26, 7–8 and *MS* 6, 5, 49–54.

*Āpastamba-paribhāṣāsūtra* (= the 24th *praśna* of the preceding one) 24, 2, 36–39 and *MS* 4, 4, 19–21.

*Hiraṇyakeśi* (or *Satyāṣāḍha*)-*śrautasūtra* 22, 4, 20 and *MS* 5, 2, 17.

*Kātyāyana-śrautasūtra* (one of the youngest) 9, 5, 29–31 + 11, 14 and *MS* 3, 5, 36–39.

On its part, *Āpastamba-dharmasūtra* (450 B. C.? Bühler) 2, 6, 13–14 has a verbal resemblance to *MS* 6, 7, 30.[6]

We have also to seek sources of the *MS* in the grammatical area. For instance, the *Vārttika* of Kātyāyana (250 B. C.?) on Pāṇini shows analogies with our *sūtras.*[7]

§ 5. Pre-Jaimini Mīmāṃsakas[8]

In the *MS,* we sometimes come across names of Jaimini's predecessors:

1. Bādarāyaṇa. Because of the problems raised by this name, it is dealt with below § 6.
2. Bādari referred to in *MS* 3, 1, 3 and 6, 1, 27ff.; also quoted in the *Vedānta-(= Brahma)sūtra* 1, 2, 30; 3, 1, 11; 4, 3, 7 and 4, 10. Thus, B seems to have spoken

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[3] GARGE 1952: 2–3; MISHRA 1964²: 11; KANE 1977²: 1152; PARPOLA 1981: 160.

[4] "Kāśakṛtsna's (work)." Kāśakṛtsna was supposed to have composed the *Saṃkarṣakāṇḍa,* see § 9, note 26. About him, see also SANKARANARAYANAN 1983: 9ff.

[5] GARGE 1952: 17, 52–53; PARPOLA 1981: 166ff.

[6] MISHRA 1964²: 12.

[7] PARPOLA 1981: 151 (quoting PARANJPE, Le Vārtika de Kātyāyana, Paris–Heidelberg 1922).

[8] GARGE 1952: 5ff.; KANE 1977²: 1173ff.; PARPOLA 1981 (more detailed, virtually exhaustive).

authoritatively on both *M* and *Vedānta,* but incidentally in an unorthodox way, since he asserted that the *śūdra* was entitled to perform the sacrifice (*MS* 6, 1, 27).

3. Ātreya: *MS* 4, 3, 18; 5, 2, 18; 6, 1, 26. Ā is also quoted in the *Vedānta-sūtra* 3, 4, 44 and in some other places such as the *Baudhāyana-gṛhyasūtra.*
4. Kārṣṇājini: *MS* 4, 3, 17; 6, 7, 35; also quoted in *Vedānta-sūtra* 3, 1, 9 and *Kātyāyana-śrautasūtra* 1, 6, 23.
5. Five more *ācāryas* ("teachers") are mentioned once: Lāvukāyana (*MS* 6, 7, 37 or 38); Kāmukāyana (*MS* 11, 1, 58); Āśmarathya[9] (*MS* 6, 5, 16); Ālekhana[9] (*MS* 6, 5, 17); Atiśāyana (*MS* 3, 2, 43).

§ 6. Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini

Both B and J are quoted in both the *Mīmāṃsā-* and *Vedānta-sūtras.*[10]

B is quoted in *MS* 1, 1, 5; 5, 2, 19; 6, 1, 8; 10, 8, 44; 11, 1, 65. Should we suppose that he is the same person as the author of the *Vedānta-sūtra?* In any case, he seems to be different from an other Bādarāyaṇa, a Vedic teacher who is the representative of the *Hiraṇyakeśi* school.[11]

J recurs eleven times in the *Vedānta-sūtra:* 1, 2, 28 and 31; 1, 3, 31; 1, 4, 18; 3, 2, 40; 3, 4, 2, 18 and 40; 4, 3, 12; 4, 4, 5 and 11, in connection with topics either ritual or speculative.[12]

B is quoted nine times in his own *sūtra.*

J is quoted five times in the *MS:* 3, 1, 4; 6, 3, 4; 8, 3, 7; 9, 2, 39; 12, 1, 7. Is he referring to himself or to an older Jaimini? The second possibility would be more probable, especially in 6, 3, 4 where he is stating a view (a *pūrvapakṣa,* if it is) to be rejected.

Are there several B's and several J's? That would be possible, at least for Jaimini which is a *gotra* name.

What is the relationship between the two collections of *sūtras?* A. Parpola claims that J could have been the author of both of them, while B would only have reworked the portion *Vedānta-sūtra,* but so fundamentally that he would have put the name of J into the background.[13]

Whatever it may be, the simultaneous presence of the names in the two sets of *sūtras* cannot but reinforce the conviction of a solidarity between *Pūrva-* and *Uttara-mīmāṃsā.* Yet, by lack of significant information from external sources, it is difficult to go further into the elucidation of the problems.

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[9] About these Vedic teachers, Parpola 1981: 166 notices their appearance in the *Āpastamba-śrautasūtra;* on Ātreya (above n° 3), o.c. 173.

[10] Garge 1952: 14–15ff.; Kane 1977²: 1160; Parpola 1981: 155ff.

[11] Parpola 1981: 173.

[12] When B wishes to call attention to some topic dealt with in the *MS,* he uses the words *tad uktam* (e.g., 3, 3, 33), Sarma 1963: XV.

[13] Parpola 1981: 151. Other view in Pereira, Religious Studies 22 (1986), 193ff.

## CHAPTER II:
## THE FOUNDERS OF THE MĪMĀṂSĀDARŚANA: JAIMINI AND ŚABARA

§ 7. Jaimini. Biographical data and chronological position.[14]

As for so many Indian authors, the data about the life of J are extremely scarce. We know hardly more than his name. The strangest information is provided by *Pañcatantra* 2,34: he would have been crushed to death by an elephant. According to Kumārila (ad *MS-ŚB* 1, 3, 5), he would have written a *Chāndogyānuvāda.* Anyhow, as a *gotra* name, Jaimini is chiefly connected with the works of the Vedic *Sāmavedins* ("singers"): *Jaiminīya-brāhmaṇa* and *upaniṣad.* Did he come from and was he taught in these circles?

It is extremely difficult to determine his chronological position. On the one hand, J is familiar with the ritualistic science and with at least a part of the *Dharma* literature, and he discusses the value of the *Smṛti* in 1, 3, 11–14. On the other hand, *mīmāṃsā* formulations can be traced back to as early as 450 B. C. (?) (see § 4).

So we ought to conclude carefully that the *MS* might be of a rather high antiquity: 450–400 B. C. (? the age of Pāṇini?), but the collection took its present form under the influence and the name of one or several[15] Jaimini(s) in a later period. But when? Is it at the time when Kātyāyana the grammarian commented Pāṇini in his *Vārttika,* about 250 B. C. (?),[16] or when the *Vedānta-sūtras* were redacted, that is between 200 and 300 A. D. (?).[17]

§ 8. The *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra(s) (MS)*

There are 2745 of them,[18] that is more than in any collection of this kind (*Vedānta-sūtras:* 555; *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras:* 370; *Nyāya-sūtras:* about 500). Such a bulkiness has discouraged any global approach; so far, there has been no full-scale study of them.

Sometimes the *sūtra* is very short (one declined word, as 9, 2, 26 *sve ca* "And in itself"), and, in this case, it is to be linked with those around it. Sometimes, on the contrary, it contains several sentences or clauses as in 1, 1, 5:

> "The relation of the word with its denotation is inborn / Instruction is the means of knowing the Dharma / Infaillible regarding all that is imperceptible, it is a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent, according to Bādarāyaṇa" (tr. JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 8).

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[14] GARGE 1952: 13ff.; MISHRA 1964[2]: 13.

[15] See § 6.

[16] PARPOLA 1981: 151 quoting PARANJPE, Le Vārtika ..., 76.

[17] PARPOLA 1981: 149 quoting L. RENOU, L'Inde Classique II (Paris 1953), § 1372.

[18] They are distributed in 12 books or *adhyāyas* (literally "recitation"), divided themselves into 4 *pādas* ("quarter"), except the *adhyāyas* 3, 6 and 8 which consist of 8 *pādas.* For the *ṣaḍsūtrī* see § 13.

Some *sūtras* are even longer and turn into genuine discussions, e.g., 4, 3, 11.

The particles *tu* ("but") and *api vā* ("preferably") show that the debate is passing from a preliminary view *(pūrvapakṣa)* to a conclusive one *(siddhānta)*. When a *sūtra* is ending with *cet,* it is an objection to which the next one replies (11, 3, 47–48).

A number of *sūtras* disconnected by the gloss of Ś do actually form a thought unit. It is the case when a command is followed by one or more motivations. Let us quote 3, 5,

> "(37) In reality the *hotar* priest (should eat first), as such is the indication of the *mantra* text *(mantravarṇāt);* (38) also because such is the declaration *(vacanāc ca);* (39) also because of the order of sequence among the grounds (of eating) *(kāraṇānupūrvyāc ca)*" (tr. JHĀ 1973–1974²: 560–561).

Such a scheme is common. Out of the 136 *sūtras* of the 8th *adhyāya,* 36 (that is 25%) are causal ablatives.

Some *sūtras* are repeated, up to thirty times for *liṅgadarśanāc ca* (8, 4, 20; 12, 4, 4 etc.), twenty-four times for *tathā cānyārthadarśanam* (6, 7, 10; 11, 4, 3 etc.).[19] *Sūtras* including a quotation are very rare and ambiguous.[20] Others were already particularly cryptic and troublesome even for the early commentators. For example, 1, 1, 4 was either divided to allow two interpretations[21] or regarded as a unity; whence polemics between Bhavadāsa and Kumārila (see § 10). The latter often has his own standpoint whether a *sūtra* is to be divided or not (e.g., 3, 2, 14).[22]

Finally it is worth noting that a lot of *sūtras* must have been versified or rather written in a rhythmic prose. A *triṣṭubh* cadence in the clausules is usual.[23]

## § 9. The *Saṃkarṣa(ṇa)kāṇḍa*

This "Collecting Chapter"[24] is a set of 465 *sūtras* divided into four books *(adhyāya),*[25] and forming a supplement to the twelve books *(Dvādaśalakṣaṇī)* of the *MS*. The *SK* deals with sundry ritual problems, such as a subsidiary of the *agniṣṭoma* called *anuvaṣaṭkārayāga,* the sacrificial post *(yūpa),* the *avadāna* or cutting of the oblations for each deity, the *varaṇa* or appointment of the priests, and lastly, various kinds of *mantra.*

The tradition (the doctor Vedāntadeśika for example) is inclined to ascribe the *SK* to Jaimini.[26] Indeed, the whole *śāstra* made up by the *M* and the *Vedānta* supposedly included 20 books.[27] But if we add the 12 of Jaimini to the 4 of Bādarāyaṇa, this amounts to 16. The 4 books of the *SK* would thus suit very well to come up to 20.

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[19] *Sūtras* 1, 1, 1 and 3, 11; 4, 1, 1 and 8, 1, 1 start with the word *atha.*

[20] List of 22 instances in GARGE 1952: 297–298.

[21] STRAUSS 1932: 524 note.

[22] KANE 1977²: 1334–1335. See also below § 13.

[23] SMITH 1953.

[24] As to this name and others (*Devatākāṇḍa* and so on), see LARIVIERE 1981: 180, 193.

[25] Consisting of 16 *pādas* and 386 *adhikaraṇas*. Lists in *MK* 3, 47ff. *(adhikaraṇa)* and in SARMA 1963: 17ff. *(sūtra)*.

[26] For an ascription to Kāśakṛtsna (§ 3) or others, LARIVIERE 1981: 184, 186, 194.

[27] Confirmation in an inscription of Anur (Chingleput district, Tamil Nadu) of 999 A.D.

The *SK* is alluded to in the *ŚB* (on *MS* 10, 4, 32 and 12, 2, 11), but neither Ś nor K have apparently written a gloss on it. For a long time, the *SK* has been forgotten and its manuscripts have been discovered only lately.[28] Its text was to be reconstructed, and the last editions are satisfactory, even if complete certainty has not yet been achieved. The first commentary we possess upon the *SK* is that of Devasvāmin (11th c.).[29] Later on, Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita of Tanjore (1580–1650) wrote a *Saṃkarṣanyāyamuktāvalī* up to the end of the first *adhyāya.* And during the 18th c., Bhāskararāya (1700–1760) was the author of a *Bhāṭṭacandrikā* on them, in which he extensively quotes his predecessor Devasvāmin.[30]

§ 10. Pre-Śabara teachers

Between the *sūtrakāra* Jaimini and the *bhāṣyakāra* Ś a dark period elapses wherein we only meet the names of Upavarṣa and Bodhāyana, whose works are lost.[31]

Less uncertain is the personality of Bhavadāsa. He is well-known to Kumārila who takes into account his explanation of the first words *(atha-ataḥ)* of *MS* 1, 1, 1 (see *ŚV* 1, 63b) and his treatment of *MS* 1, 1, 4 (see *ŚV* 4 = *pratyakṣasūtra* 13). The latter *sūtra* was splitted up by Bh into two parts. Thus the first sentence, which is a definition of perception,[32] was severed from the second one that normally supplies it with a Vedic background.[33] So considering perception to be a purely epistemological problem, viz. the arising of an idea from the contact of sense and object, Bh provoked the hostility not only of the Buddhists for whom that is impossible, but also of the Mīmāṃsakas themselves who do not envisage perception as disconnected from the Vedic *dharma* (implicit with the word *animittaṃ*).

Frauwallner[34] would be inclined to identify this Bh with a "Commentator" *(Vṛttikāra)* who is referred to and criticized by Dignāga (480–540 A.D.) in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* as dividing *MS* 1, 1, 4 into two parts as well.

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[28] Mainly from South India: Malabar, Trivandrum, Madras; all of them seem to proceed from the same origin.

[29] Ed. S. S. Sastri 1965. Sarma 1963 has published the 186 *sūtras* of *adhyāya* 1 without any gloss at all.

[30] Ed. Rāma Miśra Śāstri, Pandit Reprint, Benares 1894; see Lariviere 1981: 189. It is Bhāskararāya's commentary that is reproduced in the *MK.*

[31] The former is mentioned in *ŚB* 1, 1, 5 *sphoṭavāda* = tr. Jhā 1973–1974[2]: 19; the latter supposedly wrote a commentary named *Kṛtakoṭi;* both of them are quoted in an anonymous work, the *Prapañcahṛdaya* (11th c.?), Sarma 1963: XVII; Parpola 1981: 153–154; Lariviere 1981: 187.

[32] "That production of an idea in a person, when contact of the sense-organs is arising, is sense-perception" *(satsaṃprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma / tat pratyakṣam).*

[33] "... and it is not a means (of knowing the *dharma*), as it apprehends (only) things existing at the present time" *(animittaṃ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt).*

[34] 1968: 99–100, 108. Frauwallner there publishes the Tibetan text of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* conveying the polemics between the idealist (Dignāga) and the realist (a Mīmāṃsaka).

§ 11. The (second) Vṛttikāra

He is the main predecessor of Ś. Of this genuine philosopher nothing has come down to us except a part of his doctrine quoted by Ś in his gloss on *MS* 1, 1, 5 (§ 8).[35] This "Commentator" went a step further on the path of the realist and antibuddhist epistemology. Like Bhavadāsa, he divided *MS* 1, 1, 4, but, moreover, interchanged in it *sat* and *tat;* this resulted in the following translation.

> "That cognition is *real (sat)* sense-perception, which appears when there is contact of the sense-organ with *that* (*tat* = the outside object)."[36]

And when asked how a cognition originating in such a contact can be differentiated from another deprived of it, the Vṛttikāra explained:

> "When it is found that, at the time of the perception in question, there is no contact (of the sense-organ concerned) with any object other than the one perceived, it follows that the perception has appeared on the contact with the object actually perceived; and when the contrary is the case, the perception is taken as following upon contact with something other than the object perceived ... How is this known when, for instance, a person taking a shell to be silver thinks: 'My eye is in contact with silver?' ... (Answer) When a correcting cognition is born: 'This is not thus, this is a false cognition' ... When the *manas* (mind) is afflicted because of hunger, etc., or a sense-organ by *timira* (jaundice) etc., or the external object is (characterized) by extreme minuteness etc., then the cognition (is) false; if (all these are) not afflicted (by the above-mentioned disadvantages), the cognition is true ..."[37]

The Vṛttikāra may have lived within fifty years before Ś, that is between 300 and 350 A. D.[38] Anticipating K (see § 31), he is the first Mīmāṃsaka to have dealt with epistemological questions such as the *svataḥprāmāṇyam.* But in his attempt he was hampered by the frame of the system.

§ 12. Śabara Svāmin ("Lord" Śabara)

About him we are also in the dark. And when, in his work, he provides some geographical or material details, these are too sweeping to be very useful. However, from the mention of certain towns, areas or food habits, it might be concluded that he was a native of the North, of the valley of the Ganges or Mithilā.[39] On *MS* 9, 3, 32, he notices that Sanskrit is used from the Himalayas to the Cape Comorin. Such a statement would fit in, if he was living at the time of or just after the memorable expedition of Samudragupta into the Deccan and further into the South, between 350 and 400 A. D.[40]

Some traditional stories about Ś are recorded among the pandits. His real name allegedly was Ādityadeva, which was subsequently changed into *Śabara* "Forester,"

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[35] On his personality, see D'SA 1980, who sums up the *Vṛttikāragrantha,* pp. 40ff. On *MS* 2, 3, 16, Ś declares his indebtedness to a Vṛttikāra who helped him find out an interpolation in a set of *sūtras*. But is he the same as that above?

[36] This new import of *MS* 1, 1, 4 lies inside *MS* 1, 1, 5. See STRAUSS 1932: 473.

[37] Translations JHĀ 1973–1974²: 11 and D'SA 1980: 65. See also BIARDEAU 1964: 71.

[38] FRAUWALLNER 1968: 113; ZANGENBERG 1962.

[39] MISHRA 1964²: 17ff.

[40] But the date of ca. 50 B. C. is traditional among the pandits, JHĀ 1964²: 12.

for fear of the Jaina persecution.[41] Perusing the text of the *Bhāṣya,* we could also gather that Ś belonged to the *Maitrāyaṇīya-śākhā.*[42]

§ 13. The *Śābara-bhāṣya (ŚB).* The division of the text.

Ś has imposed an extra division on Jaimini's *sūtras.* To the *adhyāya* ("book") and the *pāda* ("chapter"), he added the *adhikaraṇa (adh.)* ("topic," i.e. "group of *sūtras*"), which usually consists of 4 *sūtras* and forms in itself a independent unit. Consequently, the references to the *ŚB* should have four figures, those of the *adhyāya, pāda, adh.* and *sūtra.* But in practice and in the pages below, the indication of the *adh.* is dropped.

Each *adh.* starts with the *sūtra* and continues with the subject of investigation *(viṣaya),* which, in about 800 out of the 915 *adh.,* is a quotation taken from the ancient ritual literature.[43] It is correct to say that the *viṣaya* is the actual topic of the discussion,[44] more than the *sūtra,* which is rather used as a kind of title for a step in the debate.

The *adh.* are given a label on account of their contents. Some are well-known, e.g., *devatādhikaraṇa* = *ŚB* 9, 1, *adh.* 4; *smṛtyadh.* = 1, 3, *adh.* 1; *grahaikatvanyāya* = 3, 1, *adh.* 7; *pātrabhedanyāya* = 5, 2, *adh.* 8.[45]

Whereas the numbering of the *pādas* is alike in JHĀ 1973–1974[2], SANDAL 1979[2] and in the *MK,* there are some discrepancies in the numbering of the *adh.* and *sūtras* located in them. In *ŚB* 1, 3, the fourth *sūtra* is put before the *adh.* 3 by JHĀ, because K is assuming here two *adh.* But it is left in *adh.* 2 by *MK* 7, 3760 (with hesitation all the same) and *Mīmāṃsādarśanam* 2, 102. K again links *sūtras* 5–6 with 4, but declares 7 to form an *adh.* by itself.[46] He divides 3, 2, 14 into two halves so that the relevant *adh.* (n° 5) ends with *sūtra* 15 in *MK* 7, 4325, but with *sūtra* 14 in JHĀ, who does not take Kumārila's view into account.

Incidentally, *MK* counts up two more *sūtras* than JHĀ, e.g., in 11, 3, *adh.* 4 or in 11, 4, *adh.* 1. The same *sūtra* is apt to more than one explanation or *adh. ŚB* 1, 3, 30 for example is accounted for in two *adh.,* the second (10B) being a later addition.[47] Similarly *ŚB* 4, 1, 2 is commented in three *varṇaka* "explicative samples".

Finally, K (*TV* on *MS-ŚB* 3, 4, 1–10) is the first to signal the existence of six extra *sūtras (ṣaḍsūtrī)* to be placed after 3, 4, 9 and embodying four *adh.*[48]

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[41] JHĀ 1978[2]: 7.

[42] GARGE 1952: 117.

[43] GARGE 1952: 27.

[44] Pārthasārathi Miśra (§ 55), in his gloss on *ŚV* 1, 37ff., already remarks that Ś made effort to comment upon the Vedic sentences more than upon the *sūtras* (DV. SASTRI 1978: 11).

[45] An exhaustive list of the *adh.* with their titles, first in the order of their occurrence in the *ŚB,* and then in the alphabetical order is provided in *MK,* at the beginning of vol. 3.

[46] JHĀ 1978[2]: 140; KANE 1977[2]: 1260 and 1263.

[47] D'SA 1980: 157–158.

[48] KANE 1977[2]: 1188; JHĀ 1978[2]: 195–196. These *sūtras* are given in *MK* 2, 1168–1169 and 1161–1162.

§ 14. *ŚB*. Dialectic method

Like the *MS*, the *ŚB* carries on the debate along the standard pattern drawn up in the philosophical literature. Within the frame of the *adhikaraṇa*, a *pūrvapakṣin (PP)* tells *(āha)* one or several prima facie views. The answer, introduced by the verb *ucyate*, states the established standpoint, the *Siddhānta (S)*. But the deviations from this plain twofold structure are not infrequent. Inside both *PP* and *S*, there are people demurring in favour of the other view, so that the course of the discussion gets confused. Sometimes a clear *S*, a definite conclusion, is lacking. All this explains that K or even MM (in the *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā*, § 48) are at odds with Ś about the place of a *sūtra* in the dialectic frame.[49] This can be indicated in some places by the words *nanu* or *yat tu, iti cet* or *prāpte* respectively beginning and closing an objection.[50] K too can help us by declaring that such or such a passage is in the mouth of the *siddhāntavādin* (e.g., on *MS-ŚB* 3, 1, 14 = *MK* 3, 1638b, 10).

Lastly, it is worth noting that the *PP* frequently vindicates a rationalistic *(laukika)* view.

§ 15. *ŚB*. Quotations

The *ŚB* presents itself as a commentary upon nearly 2000 Vedic and post-Vedic citations *(udāharaṇa)*, mainly from the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* and *-brāhmaṇa* or the *Āpastamba-śrautasūtra*.[51] They are often made by heart and carelessly, and remain approximate, at least with regard to the texts we know.[52]

Here and there two source-texts are combined in a single citation. There are also adaptations to the *Bhāṣya* context. According to their origin, *Śruti (saṃhitā, brāhmaṇa)* or *Smṛti (śrauta- and gṛhyasūtra)*, they are introduced by distinct verbs: *śrūyate/āmnāyate* versus *dṛśyate/ucyate*.[53] They play a crucial role in the debates. Some stock quotations (e.g., *grahaṃ saṃmārṣṭi, paśum ālabheta)* are submitted to intensive reflexion.

§ 16. *ŚB*. A summary[54]

*Adhyāya* 1: definition of the *dharma;* relation word-meaning and *vidhi-arthavāda* (§ 20); importance of the *mantra;* settlement of the *Śruti-Smṛti* conflicts (see also § 37). Ś's commentary about Jaimini's first 32 *sūtras* (= the first 8 *adhikaraṇas*) is

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[49] See for instance their comments on *MS* 11, 4, 11 (or 12).

[50] For the situation in the *MS*, see § 8.

[51] It was an important enterprise (not yet brought to an end) to trace back these citations to their sources. It was undertaken by Jacob 1923–1930 (= 1984²), continued by Jhā 1973–1974² in the index of his translation, and, in the first place, by Garge 1952 who picked out about 800 quotations among which nearly 200 identified for the first time (Garge 1952: preface VI).

[52] It is worth noticing that the Mīmāṃsakas often take liberties with a message they regard as sacred and authoritative. In *ŚB* on *MS* 1, 1, 5 *(ātmavāda)*, the word *prajñānaghana* of *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4, 5, 13 is substituted by *vijñāna-°*, Strauss 1932: 491.

[53] Garge 1952: 35, 40, 73–74, 43 and 128, 49 and 133, 46.

[54] Mādhava (§ 59) has inserted a summary of the *ŚB* in his *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (Mīmāṃsā* chapter) and his *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara* (Goldstücker-Cowell 1970²: 3ff.) is a digest of it.

called *Tarkapāda* "Dialectical Chapter." For a detailed survey of *ŚB* on *MS* 1, 1, 5, see § 25.

*Adhyāya* 2: definition of the injunction and its token, the verb; power of the verb; range of the verbal actions.

*Adhyāya* 3 (8 *pādas* = 363 *sūtras*): the couple *śeṣa-śeṣin* (§ 18c).

*Adhyāya* 4: the categories of *puruṣārtha* and *kratvartha* (§ 18d).

*Adhyāya* 5: the *krama,* that is the sequence of the sacrificial performance.

*Adhyāya* 6 (8 *pādas* = 449 *sūtras*): the *adhikāra* "right (of sacrificing)" and *adhikārin* "person entitled to the fruit *(phala)* (of the sacrifice)". The famous sentence *svargakāmo yajeta* "Desiring heaven, one should perform the sacrifice" is an *adhikāra-vidhi,* because the first word denotes the *adhikārin* and the fruit he aims at. It is the most quoted sentence in the *Mīmāṃsā* texts.[55]

*Adhyāya* 7–8: the *atideśa* "transference" of details from the model sacrifice *(prakṛti)* to its modifications *(vikṛti)* (§ 18a).[56]

*Adhyāya* 9: the *ūha* "modification" of the *mantras* in order to fit them in a new rite.

*Adhyāya* 10 (the longest one, 8 *pādas* = 577 *sūtras*): the *bādha* "annulment" of an act by another; the *samuccaya* "inclusion" of an act into another.

*Adhyāya* 11: the *tantra,* i.e. act/invocation to be performed just once because it is helpful to several rites; the *āvāpa,* i.e. act/invocation to be repeated with each rite.

*Adhyāya* 12: the *prasaṅga* or occasional use of ritual elements for another performance; the *vikalpa* "option."

§ 17. *ŚB.* Liturgical problems I

The *ŚB* is fond of dealing with tiny ritual details lost, as it were, in the bulk of the Vedic treatises, but providing an opportunity of displaying some dialectic skill.[57] In 3, 8, 17ff. for instance, it is asked whether the *mantras* of the new and full moon oblations *(darśapūrṇamāsa)* are to be recited by the *yajamāna* (sponsor of the sacrifice) and the priests as well, or by the latter alone. Elsewhere, the *ŚB* expatiates on a topic already treated in the *Śrautasūtras,* such as the *upāṃśuyāja* (10, 8, 51–60), the oblation of clarified butter offered silently. There are discussions that sound queer, for example *ŚB* on *MS* 11, 4, 48ff.:

> "In connection with the *jyotiṣṭoma,* there is "scratching" of the itching parts of the body, for which the *mantra* is *kṛṣiṣu syāma kṛṣa*... [of an unknown source]. When there is itching in several parts of the body at the same time, then there arises the question: should the *mantra* be repeated with the scratching of each itching limb? or should it be recited only once? The *pūrvapakṣa* is as foliows: the *mantra* should be repeated with each limb ... (*siddhānta,* § 14) The activity in this case is not for the scratching of the body, but for allaying the itching, and this itching (which is a sensation) is in the conscious soul, not in the body. Hence there is

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[55] *Adh.* 6 also sets forth the important doctrine of the *pratinidhi* "substitute."

[56] See also Moghe 1977–1978.

[57] Hence some discussions just for argument's sake, Garge 1952: 176. It is impossible here to enter into the details of Ś's liturgical theories. His doctrine of the *agnicayana* "(rite of) piling the fire (altar)" is expounded in K. B. Sastri 1983.

nothing to distinguish one (itching or scratching) from the other. Consequently, the conclusion is that the *mantra* should be recited only once" (tr. JHĀ 1973–1974², vol. 3, 2245).

Many *adhikaraṇas* consider problems of *atideśa* and *ūha* (§ 16), especially in the use *(viniyoga)* of the *mantras*. Some "isolated" *(anārabhya)* statements are also examined as to whether they belong to a *prakṛti* or a *vikṛti* (§ 18a).[58]

§ 18. *ŚB*. Liturgical problems II

In order to clarify and classify acts and rites, the *ŚB* makes use of a number of categories operating in couples, some inherited, some coined by the *M* itself.[59]

a. The couple *prakṛti-vikṛti* is well-known in the Vedic ritual literature. *Prakṛti* is an archetypal rite such as the *agniṣṭoma* or the *gavāmayana*.[60] *Vikṛti* is an ectype, a variant in which archetypal prayers, procedures and deities undergo modifications. The *sādyaskra* (*ŚB* on *MS* 10, 1, 9ff.), for example, is a *vikṛti* of the *agniṣṭoma*.
b. The couple *pradhāna/mukhya* ("main act/entity")-*guṇa/aṅga* ("subsidiary"). So *havis* "material substance to be offered" is *pradhāna* in the oblation, whereas the deity *(devatā)* is a mere *guṇa* (*ŚB* on *MS* 8, 1, 32–33). *Saṃskāra* "act of refinement," fitting something for use in the rite is an *aṅga*. According to *ŚB-MS* 2, 1, 22, no *guṇa* is subordinate to an other.
c. The couple *śeṣa-śeṣin* is virtually the same as *aṅga-pradhāna* (*ŚB-MS* 3, 1, 2).[61]
d. The couple *puruṣārtha-kratvartha*. The former is an act laid down for the achievement of something "good for man," that is any sacrifice. The latter is an act "good for the rite," that is a secondary operation conducive to the accomplishment of the sacrifice (*ŚB-MS* 4, 1, 1ff.).
e. The couple *sāmavāyika/saṃnipatya-upakāraka* "indirectly contributing subsidiary" versus *ārād-upakāraka* "subsidiary action directly related to the main act" (*ŚB-MS* 10, 4, 38).
f. The couple *prayojaka-prayojya* "motivating force-motivated thing."
g. The couple *sāmānya-viśeṣa* "general-particular," which has a philosophical import too.
h. The important couple *adṛṣṭārtha-dṛṣṭārtha* "having an unseen (= transcendent) effect – a visible effect," in which the latter is preferably resorted to even if the former prevails in principle.
i. The important couple *bhūta-bhāvya* or *siddha-sādhya* "already in existence – to be produced," respectively referring to *dravya* "thing" and *kriyā* "act." This key distinction underlies the whole *M*, and makes it contrast with the *Vedānta*, for the *M* is mainly concerned with the act to be done, while the *V* is a research into well-established realities.[62]

[58] GARGE 1952: 183–184, 198ff. (list of the *anārabhyavidhi*).
[59] See EDGERTON 1929, glossarial index, 277ff.
[60] Description of these sacrifices in JHĀ 1978²: 248ff.; VERPOORTEN 1977, introduction.
[61] KANE 1977²: 1253ff., 1308ff.
[62] HALBFASS 1983: 78 note 108: "The basic conviction of Śaṅkara is that the message of the Veda has ultimately to be understood in terms of information and not of injunction." On this distinction, see also BIARDEAU 1964: 164; VERPOORTEN 1981a: 396; RENOU 1951: 8,22 etc.

§ 19. *ŚB*. Exegetical problems I

Lest the Vedic "Revelation" *(Śruti)* becomes unintelligible, Ś states that the words in it (as well as in the *MS*) have the same meanings as in common parlance.[63] Thus in the face of apparently senseless utterances of the Veda, he must prove himself very subtle in explaining them away. On *MS* 6, 7, 41, e. g., he asserts that in the expression "thousand-year sacrifice," the word "year" is synonymous with "day." But on *MS* 9, 4, 22, the word *uru* (of *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* 1, 3, 4, 1) is normally glossed by means of *vistīrṇa* "wide/large." Elsewhere, he wonders what are the subject and the meaning of a verb.[64]

Etymologies are not wanting and can rather often be traced to the *Nirukta* of Yāska (500 B. C.?), especially in the twelve *adhikaraṇas* (*ŚB* 9, 3, *adh.* 10–13; 4, *adh.* 1–5 + 9, 1, 18; 3, 7, 13; 9, 3, 8) concerning the *adhriguprai*ṣ*a,* a liturgical prayer recited on the animal victim in the sacrifice.[65]

The *ŚB* sticks to some exegetical principles: 1. Etymology *(yoga)* is always overruled by established conventional usage *(rūḍhi)*. 2. Polysemy is unfair for a word.[66] 3. The primary meaning *(mukhya)* is to be preferred and not the secondary/figurative *(gauṇa)*. Nevertheless, use is, if necessary, made of *lakṣaṇā* "symbolical/connotative value" or *upacāra* "metaphor."

§ 20. *ŚB*. Exegetical problems II

In order to make its exegetical task easier, *Ś* has sorted out the sentences of the Veda *(= Brāhmaṇa)* in a set of patterns.

Prescriptive statements (*vidhi/codanā;* at places *śāstra/āmnāya*).[67] Their importance is due to the fact that they point out an act and a result which are totally new, and that without standing in need of giving reasons. See also § 23.

Informative/commendatory statements *(arthavāda),*[68] the purpose of which is to impel man to perform the rites by praising *(stuti)* them or to discard him from doing wrong deeds by blaming *(nindā)* them. The *arth.* lose their purport when they are disconnected from the *vidhis* (*ŚB* 1, 2 *adh.* 1–3). Some rules are laid down to prevent a confusion between *vidhi* and *arth.* Eleven *adh.* are devoted to display the kinds of *arth.*

*Mantra* portions that remind the *yajamāna* which procedure is to be performed. About their nature, Ś carries on, in 1, 2, *adh.* 4, a discussion which is a revised and enlarged version of *Nirukta* 1, 15–16.[69] He wonders whether the *mantras* have a

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[63] *ŚB* on *MS* 1, 1, 1. Garge 1952: 253ff.; Biardeau 1964: 84; Kane 1977²: 1289 (*ŚB* on *MS* 3, 2, 1–2).

[64] Verpoorten 1981b.

[65] Garge 1952: 158, 204ff. Sixty *adh.*, those of *ŚB* 2, 1; 5, 3; 9, 1 and 2, 10, 5 and 6, deal with matters concerning the liturgical melody *(sāman)*.

[66] Garge 1952: 207, 254; Renou 1959: 64; Kane 1977²: 1290; Kunjunni Raja 1977³: 43.

[67] Kane 1977²: 1225.

[68] Garge 1952: 261ff.; Kane 1977²: 1238ff.; Halbfass 1983: 43.

[69] Strauss 1927: 120ff.; Garge 1952: 258ff.; Renou 1959: 68ff.; Kane 1977²: 1220, 1275.

purely magical function or their meaning is to be considered. Here is a short extract on this point:

> "The *mantra(s)* has/have the order of its/their words irrevocably fixed; for instance, the order of the *mantra agnir mūrdhā divaḥ* ... 'Agni is the head of the sky' (*Taittirīya-saṃhitā* 1, 5, 5, 1) must be *a.-m.-d.*, and not the reverse *(d.-m.-a.);* if the words were meant to express a meaning, they would express it when placed in this latter order as well; and in this case, there would be no sense in the fixing of the exact order of the words" (*ŚB* on *MS* 1, 2, 32; tr. JHĀ 1973–1974², vol. 1, 76).

Ś also makes observations regarding the *nāmadheya* "names (of sacrifices)"[70] and mythological stories of the Veda, which he regards as allegorical, in order to rule out any charge that the Veda has a beginning in time.

§ 21. *ŚB.* Exegetical problems III

The *ŚB,* in the long *balābalādhikaraṇa* on *MS* 3, 3, 14, puts forth a series of rules to be used in the exegetical work.[71] In principle, the words of a sentence are to be taken at their face value (*śruti* = direct assertion[72]). But when that is not possible, they should be explained by a characteristic *(liṅga),* in the frame of the sentence (*vākya* = syntactic connection) or of a broader context *(prakaraṇa),* by their position *(sthāna)* or as label names *(samākhyā).* In this somewhat composite series, each following means of proof or mode of evidence is weaker than the former. That holds good in a case of conflict such as in the stock example "With the verse dedicated to Indra, one should worship the gārhapatya fire" (*Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā* 12, 66). Here there is doubt as to whether the *mantra* is to be used for the veneration of Indra (according to the *liṅga,* i.e. the word Indra quoted in the verse) or the fire (= god Agni) (according to the *śruti*). It is decided in favour of the *śruti* in *ŚB* on *MS* 3, 2, 3–4.

But the *ŚB* that is inclined to dismiss any meaning of the sentence beyond those of the words *(padārtha)* (on *MS* 1, 1, 25), has, however, brought out three interpretative principles in order to ascertain the limits of the *vākya.* These are:

a. *ekavākyatā* "syntactical connection" (2, 1, 56): semantically interconnected words are to be treated as a single sentence.[73]
b. *anuṣaṅga* "elliptical extension" (2, 1, 48): one single element may be construed with the various clauses that need it.[74]
c. *vākyabheda,* see next §.

There are also different methods to complete defective sentences. When the fruit *(phala)* of an injunction is not given, the reader is allowed to postulate heaven,

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[70] KANE 1977²: 1244ff.

[71] GARGE 1952: 276ff.; KANE 1977²: 1309; for detailed cases, DEVASTHALI 1959: 179ff.

[72] This meaning is distinct from *Śruti* (with capital *Ś*) "Vedic Revelation."

[73] *MS* 2, 1, 46 gives a definition of the *vākya:* "So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, which, being separated, are found to be wanting (= incapable of effecting the purpose), they form one sentence." On this text, see BIARDEAU 1964: 202; KANE 1977²: 1297ff.; CARDONA 1983: 148ff.

[74] KANE 1977²: 1304.

according to the *viśvajinnyāya* "rule of the total victory" (*ŚB* on *MS* 4, 3, 16), or to seek in the context (even if it is an *arthavāda*) a reward suiting the prescription (*rātrisattranyāya* "rule of the night session," *ŚB* on *MS* 4, 3, 17). On the other hand, a statement of the fruit is to be completed by means of a statement of the procedure.[75]

With regard to each *vidhi,* the Mīmāṃsaka wonders which elements in it are new and therefore are to be enjoined *(vidhitsita)* and which ones are known otherwise *(prāpta, anuvāda)* and thus intended to be merely mentioned *(nirdeśa),* that is to be subordinate.[76]

Finally there are plenty of arguments in the *ŚB* about the aim of textual repetition. By itself it is a blunder and a superfluity. The repetitions occurring in the Vedic Revelation *(Śruti)* have consequently to be given grounds. This repetition concept intervenes also at the ritual level, (*ŚB* on *MS* 11, 1, 30) where we learn that a subordinate act is not repeated with each primary, and later on, at the epistemological level (for example with Kumārila).

Accordingly, in order to understand the *ŚB,* the modern reader should be perfectly acquainted with all that the text says but also does not say.

§ 22. *ŚB.* The *vākyabheda (vbh)*

A basic tenet of the *M* is that a sentence carries one single message. If a *vidhi* (§ 20) enjoined two things, it would be vitiated by a *vbh,* a "sentence splitting." Such a blunder can only be removed, if one lays down a ranking in the components of the *vākya* and assigns a distinctive function to each of them. For instance, what is enjoining cannot be specifying[77] and vice versa.

As early as his commentary on *MS* 1, 1, 1, Ś speaks of the *vbh.*[78] On *MS* 3, 1, 14, he notices that the same sentence is unable to prescribe the cleansing of the cup and that of a single cup.[79] The contingence of *vbh* especially occurs in sentences simultaneously expressing a ritual act *(agniṣṭoma)* and the wish of a reward (heaven, children ...), viz. in an *adhikāravidhi.* The conflict is settled by laying down an order of priority: the goal (heaven) is prior *(pradhāna),* because it subserves the bliss of the sacrificer *(puruṣārtha),* whereas the act is merely a means towards this goal.

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[75] JHĀ 1978[2]: 189.

[76] *ŚB* on *MS* 9, 4, 32 quoted by DEVASTHALI 1959: 164; VERPOORTEN 1984: 537.

[77] GARGE 1952: 196; BIARDEAU 1964: 84–85 (*vbh* in an *arthavāda*); VERPOORTEN 1984. The word *vbh* is seemingly less frequent in the works of the later Mīmāṃsakas.

[78] "In fact, the single sentence (= the sūtra *athāto dharmajijñāsā* 'Next therefore comes the enquiry into the *dharma*') could not deny the possibility of the enquiry into the *dh.* before the reading of the Veda, and, at the same time, affirm the immediate sequence of the enquiry to the reading. If this were to be done, then there would be two distinct sentences (involved in the *sūtra*) ... and the author of the *sūtra* is going to declare later on that it is only when a group of words expresses one single idea that it can be taken as one sentence" (text in FRAUWALLNER 1968: 10; tr. JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: I, 1–2; brief explanation in STRAUSS 1932: 495 n.).

[79] VERPOORTEN 1984: 530–533. A *vidhi* normally enjoins one single new thing, the rest being already established, but when it is deprived of any antecedent, it can embody several *guṇa,* KANE 1977[2]: 1295 n., 1300 according to *TV* on *MS-ŚB* 2, 2, 6: *prāpte karmaṇi, nāneko vidhātuṃ śakyate guṇaḥ / aprāpte tu vidhīyante bahavo 'py ekaprayatnataḥ.*

§ 23. *ŚB*. Grammatical problems

Even if grammar is viewed by Ś as ancillary to the exegesis of the Veda, it is nevertheless essential, for it helps to make clear the truth residing in the words while the Veda does it in life. Ś choses as his models Pāṇini, Kātyāyana as well as Patañjali. Although he is cautious in citing the last by his name, he borrows from him a number of data,[80] without, however, treating them in the same way. In the *ŚB,* no technical account of the formation of the words is given, but there is a classification of the forms according to their function in the ritual phrases.

Ś describes the contrast between the verb *(karmaśabda, ākhyāta)* and the noun *(nāman).*[81] The former has priority, because what is to be done – the act *(kriyā)* – has a comparative priority over what has been done and is already present, i.e. the substance *(dravya)* and its properties *(guṇa).* He studies various kinds of *vidhi,* usually in the optative mood (*liṅ* in the Pāṇinian phraseology).[82] A stock example is *darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeta* "Desirous of heaven, he should sacrifice with the new and full moon ceremonies."[83] The *liṅ* ending differentiates this sentence from any other, even expressing also a ritual act and a reward, such as "The man whose ladle is made of *parṇa* wood does not hear any evil word (about himself)."[84] Lastly, Ś concentrates on the relationship between the affix and the basic root (e.g. on *MS* 9, 1, 1B).

Ś states also an accurate and consistent doctrine of the *kārakas* (grammatical relationships) and *vibhaktis* (case endings) from a ritual point of view.[85] Among them, the accusative *(dvitīyā vibh.)* is regarded by Ś (in agreement with Pāṇini) as denoting the "most desired object" *(īpsitatamaṃ karma),* and, as such, the *pradhāna* ("chief element") of the statement, e.g., in *grahaṃ saṃmārṣṭi* "He (should) cleanse(s) the *(soma-)*cup."[86] Moreover, the *vibhakti -m* in *graham* conveys the ideas of gender and number; the latter may casually be "significant" *(vivakṣita).*[87]

Observations are also made on the instrumental (referring to the means of sacrificing), the dative (for the deity, the donee in the sacrifice), the tenses, moods, voices and so on. An analysis is supplied of the compounds in order to ascertain the relationship between their parts. In *ŚB* on *MS* 6, 1, 51, the question arises as to whether the compound *niṣādasthāpati* is to be understood as "chief of the Niṣāda" *(tatpuruṣa)* or as "chief being himself a N." *(karmadhāraya).* The latter interpretation is better.[88]

[80] The parallels are collected by GARGE 1952: 239ff.

[81] *ŚB* on *MS* 2, 1, 1–4; KANE 1977²: 1237.

[82] *ŚB* on *MS* 4, 3, 3 quotes a *kārikā* listing all the mandatory verbal forms (KANE 1977²: 1226ff.). On 9, 1, 41, *ŚB* notices that the particle *vai* is not ordinarily used in a *vidhi* (KANE, 1227).

[83] The sentence is not found verbatim in the Vedic ritual literature, GARGE 1952:128.

[84] *ŚB* on *MS* 3, 6, 1 (*parṇamayīnyāya,* see also § 52). On this *phalārthavāda,* see DEVASTHALI 1959: 178.

[85] On this point and grammatical aspects in general, see DEVASTHALI 1959.

[86] *ŚB* on *MS* 3, 1, 14–15 (VERPOORTEN 1984). But if the accusative is a disguised instrumental as in *saktūn juhoti* "He offers the barley meal" = actually "He makes an oblation with the barley meal," the verb is *pradhāna.*

[87] As in *paśum ālabheta* "He should sacrifice one single animal victim," *MS* 4, 1, 11.

[88] GARGE 1952: 270–271; JHĀ 1964²: 336; KANE 1977²: 1295–1296.

§ 24. *ŚB.* Socio-economical insights.

As the Vedic sacrifice is performed by priests chosen and "paid" by the *yajamāna,* i.e. the man who hopes for the relevant reward (heaven, health, rain ...), there are opportunities of discussing the following points:

What and how much are the ritual fees of these priests, namely the *dakṣiṇā?* What is their incentive: pure *dharma* or exchange of services?[89]

What can be given as a *dakṣiṇā?* How far do the proprietary rights of the *yajamāna* extend?[90]

Is the wealth to be got at only for the sake of the sacrifice?[91]

Which persons are entitled to fulfil the sacerdotal task, the *śūdra* being excluded in any case?[92]

What is the role of the wife in the liturgical procedure, and, incidentally, what is the nature of marriage?[93]

§ 25. *ŚB.* Philosophical problems

It is difficult to deny any philosophical bias in the *ŚB.* In it, sheer exegesis is constantly interspersed with logical generalizations and statements. Discussions over minor or trivial ritual details tend to widen into speculative reflections, for instance on *MS* 4, 3, 2, with regard to causality.

From a philosophical point of view, the chief passage is obviously the lengthy *adhikaraṇa* 1, 1, 5 embodying the doctrine of the Vṛttikāra (§ 11) together with that of Ś *(ātmavāda).* In view of the complexity and the importance of this chapter, we shall now proceed to sum up its contents. Its parts are listed below with their traditional titles, a brief summary and references to editions, translations and relevant studies.

1. *Autpattikasūtra:* the relationship word-meaning *(śabdārthasaṃbandha)* is inborn *(autpattika, nitya)* and infallible *(avyatireka),* being independent from the human will. Thence the word is a valid means of knowing *(pramāṇa)* the *dharma.* This point is again discussed in the *śabdārthasaṃbandhanityatvavāda* (below n° 9), *MK* 3, 1330; Frauwallner 1968: 24; Jhā 1973–1974[2]: 8–9; D'sa 1980: 93–94.
2. *Vṛttikāragrantha* (see § 11): the value of perception, limited to the visible world but fully valid in that sphere. Causes of defective knowledge: weakness of the sense-organs; minuteness of the object; falsification of the first perception by the next sublative one, *MK* 7, 3708–3709; Frauwallner 1968: 24–26; Jhā 1973–1974[2]: 10–11; Strauss 1932: 475; Biardeau 1964: 70; Jhā 1964[2]: 80ff.
3. *Nirālambanavāda* and *Śūnyavāda:* polemics against the Buddhists *(Vijñānavādin)* who deny any perception proceeding from a contact mind-external object, and

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[89] *ŚB* on *MS* 10, 2, 22–28; 3, 35 (Garge 1952: 293–294; Malamoud 1976: 179ff.).

[90] *ŚB* on *MS* 6, 7, 3.

[91] *ŚB* on *MS* 4, 1, 23 including a discussion over *svatva* "ownership, property" (Derrett 1968: 130ff.; Kane 1973[2]: 550).

[92] *ŚB* on *MS* 6, 1, 27.

[93] *ŚB* on *MS* 6, 1, 14ff. (Garge 1952: 268 n.).

claim that perceptions in waking hours and dream are alike. The *M* vindicates the reality of the outside world and dismisses the perception of the idea (*buddhi/vijñāna* = concept?), for it is formless, nameless *(avyapadeśya),* and only inferable *(anumeya), MK* 4, 2368 and 7, 3939; FRAUWALLNER 1968: 26–30; JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 12–15; JACOBI 1911; STRAUSS 1932: 476; BIARDEAU 1964: 72.

4. Survey of the *pramāṇas* "means of knowledge" (by the side of the *pratyakṣa* "perception"), namely *anumāna* "inference" and its various forms. As to the word of the Veda *(śabda, śāstra),* it is the means of reaching what is not in touch with the sense-organs, FRAUWALLNER 1968: 30–32; JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 12–15; STRAUSS 1932: 476; BIARDEAU 1964: 95.
5. *Citrāvāda:* a debate between a *PP* (§ 14) arguing that the Word of the Veda is no *pramāṇa* at all, because it expresses unreliable facts, and a *S* who will show that these very facts (i.e. cattle as fruit of the *citrā* oblation and so on) are reliable, because the Veda asserting their reliability is valid, *MK* 3, 1709–1710; JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 16–17; FRAUWALLNER 1968: 32ff.; GÄCHTER 1983.
6. *Śabdārthasaṃbandha* is the pursuing of the previous analysis, *MK* 7, 3828–3829; FRAUWALLNER 1968: 36; JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 18–19; STRAUSS 1932: 482; BIARDEAU 1964: 162–163.
7. *Sphoṭavāda:* an argument with the grammarians about the *sphoṭa.*[94] According to the realist viewpoint of the *M,* a word is nothing more than the phonemes making it up. The text is as follows:

> "As a matter of fact also, such a word as *go* ('cow') is never actually perceived apart from the letters *ga-* and the rest ... From this it is clear that the word *gauḥ,* beginning with the letter *ga-* and ending with the *ḥ* is only the letters themselves, and hence there is no thing as 'word' *(pada)* apart from those letters" (tr. JHĀ, 1973–1974[2]: 20).

So no *śabda/pada-sphoṭa* (§ 35) is extant, *MK* 7, 4423; FRAUWALLNER 1968: 32ff.; JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 19ff.; STRAUSS 1932: 483; BIARDEAU 1964: 178; KUNJUNNI RAJA 1977[3]: 111; D'SA 1980: 78–79.

8. *Ākṛtivāda:* the question arises whether the word points out a specific form *(ākṛti)* or an individual object *(vyakti).*[95] After a thorough discussion, the former view is adopted. The *ākṛti,* though, is conceived as a determination (*viśeṣaṇa* = *niyāmaka* for K) of the *vyakti,* because the latter alone is relevant in the liturgical activities.

Thereupon, an objector would like to identify *ākṛti* and group notion, e.g., a group of trees that is a forest *(vana),* but this view is turned down by the Vṛttikāra who urges the fact that the *ākṛti* is grasped in each individual entity, while the group notion depends on apprehending a collection *(samudāya), MK* 2, 788ff.; FRAUWALLNER 1968: 40–42; JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 21–22; STRAUSS 1932: 483–485; BIARDEAU 1964: 162.

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[94] See § 35. The word *sphoṭa* itself is never used in the passage. On the other hand, *MS* 1, 16, 23 claims that phonemes/syllables in the word are eternal in order to give a firm foundation to the eternity of the Veda, FRAUWALLNER 1961; BIARDEAU 1964: 181ff.

[95] See also *MS* 1, 3, 30–35 = *ākṛtyadhikaraṇa,* where the same topic is further dealt with, *MK* 2, 788ff.; JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 118ff.; STRAUSS 1932: 484, 523ff.; BIARDEAU 1964: 34, 167ff.; D'SA 1980: 87.

9. *Śabdārthasaṃbandhanityatvavāda* is taking up the discussion of 1, in order to prove that the word-object relation is everlasting and not liable to have been created by a *saṃbandhṛ* a "connector," *MK* 6, 3289; FRAUWALLNER 1968: 42–48; JHĀ 1973–1974²: 22–23; STRAUSS 1932: 486–487; BIARDEAU 1964: 157–160.

Here ends the part of the commentary ascribed to the Vṛttikāra; the next one seems to be the work of Ś himself.

10. *Ātmavāda.* In order that the reward *(phala)* of the sacrifice accrues to somebody, the permanent background of a personal subject must be laid down. To define the *ātman* or "Self," use is made of the *Vaiśeṣika* theory asserting that the determination allows to understand the determinated. In this case, it is cognition that implies the cognizer, that is a subject I *(aham),* gathering all the conscious states but being distinct from them. Ś does not elaborate this *ahaṃpratyayavijñāna,* but to the materialist and the Buddhist he brings out that the *Śruti* (= *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad* 4, 5, 13–14 etc.), far from being against him, actually endorses his own view:

> "... In support of this (view of an enduring Self) we have a *brāhmaṇa*-text. Having declared that 'this is the Self,' it goes on to say 'being imperishable, it perisheth not' (BĀU) ... Cognition on the other hand is evanescent. Hence we conclude that the Self must be something distinct from the cognition which is evanescent ... It has been urged by the opponent above: 'Leaving aside cognition, please point out the cognizer apart from the cognition.' Our answer to this is that when you leave aside the means itself, how can the end be attained without the means? ... If we 'leave aside cognition,' we cannot indicate anything at all. Then again, there is no such hard and fast rule as that the object of cognition is cognized only when the cognition itself is cognized; the object is actually cognized even when the cognition is not cognized ... So that if anything has to be 'left aside,' cognition itself might as well be left aside, not objects" (tr. JHĀ 1973–1974²: 29–31).

See also *MK* 3, 1709–1710; 2, 897; FRAUWALLNER 1968: 48–60; JHĀ 1973–1974²: 29–31; STRAUSS 1932: 486, 516–524; BIARDEAU 1968: 109ff.

§ 26. *ŚB.* Key concepts: *bhāvanā* and *apūrva*

The *M* is willing to propound the Vedic *dharma,* viz. the performance of the rites, in order to achieve the bliss *(prīti)* conventionally named *svarga.*[96] The *dharma* is lying in the mandatory core of the Veda, viz. the *vidhis* (contained in the *Brāhmaṇa*) (§§ 20, 23). In the injunctive verb[97] is hidden a mysterious power prompting somebody to a sacrificial act that is conducive to transcendent fruit. This power is called *bhāvanā,* "(force) causing to come into existence, efficient force."[98] This *bhāvanā* requires three components: a. a purpose *(phala),* the "fruit" expected from the rite,[99]

[96] On *svarga,* see VERPOORTEN 1981a. The *ŚB* does not know the doctrine of liberation and rebirth, KANE 1977²: 1215–1216.

[97] Whether it be represented by the optative or, less frequently, the indicative.

[98] The word is still scarce in the *ŚB* (on *MS* 3, 4, 13; 11, 1, 22–23), but it already attracted the attention of K, D'SA 1980: 176ff.

[99] *ŚB* on *MS* 11, 1, 24. See OERTEL 1930: 79–80.

b. a way to reach it: a *yajña,* a *homa,*[100] c. a procedure: *itikartavyatā* (word quoted in the *ŚB* on *MS* 3, 2, 18 JHĀ/19 *MK*).

The Vedic *vidhis,* being the utterances of an everlasting message, cannot prove false. The Veda has indeed no personal (human or divine[101]) promulgator; it is *apauruṣeya,* and as such, eternal, devoid of any error, "self-authenticating." It promises heaven at the end of the sacrifice, but nothing like that is evidenced at that moment. Thus the question arises: is the Veda not wrong or misleading? When coping with this major problem, the *M* in no means gives up its belief in the infallibility of the Veda, but assumes (by *arthāpatti,* § 36) that the various deeds of a rite combine to produce a mysterious result called *apūrva* "which has nothing before it,"[102] but cannot be further defined.

The *apūrva* is the answer of the *M* to the challenge of the momentariness of the acts (a pan-Indian conviction), since it goes on subsisting beyond the end of the sacrifice, up to the coming about of the *phala.* It is more properly related to the verb as far as this refers to something to be accomplished. So we see how this theological concept comes near a grammatical concept. The presence or absence of *apūrva* along with an act is a way for classifying it. The acts without *apūrva* are auxiliary and subserve the main ones. The final *apūrva* is what binds together the many operations of a rite.[103]

§ 27. *ŚB.* The language

The *ŚB* has no aesthetical claim and its language is in the first place technical. As such it should be looked upon as successful in the treatment of its object. The sentence is generally short, although it happens to contain clauses with absolutives, participles and absolute locatives. The selection of the correlatives opening both the main and subordinate clauses has been inherited from the *brāhmaṇa* prose.[104] Still close to that of Patañjali, the language of Ś is clear and classical,[105] but also dull. The verbs remain frequent and the range of their forms is still wide. As to the case endings, the locative is present in nominal sentences as well as in dependence on verbs (*SMṚ* in *MS* 2, 1, 22) or nouns (*nimitta* in *MS* 1, 3, 23);[106] the instrumental is at times predicative.[107]

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[100] *Yajña* = "sacrifice," e.g., an animal sacrifice; *homa* = "(pouring of a) libation" into the fire, GARGE 1952: 266.

[101] In the *M,* the gods *(devatā)* are virtually useless. The rite is effective quite irrespective of their intervention. They have a purely verbal existence, *ŚB* on *MS* 9, 2, 60, GARGE 1952: 268n.; SMART 1969²: 73.

[102] *ŚB* on *MS* 2, 1, 5ff.; on the notion, see HALBFASS 1980.

[103] GARGE 1952: 285; KANE 1977²: 1210ff.; HALBFASS 1983: 16–17.

[104] On the *brāhmaṇa* correlatives, VERPOORTEN 1977: chapter XX, §§ 503ff.

[105] RENOU 1956: 139–140.

[106] On 3, 1, 12, an absolute locative and a simple one are put together: *avivakṣite punaḥ kārake saṃbandhamātravivakṣāyāṃ ṣaṣṭhī* (quoted DEVASTHALI 1959: 169).

[107] E.g., *ŚB* on *MS* 9, 4, 13: *ṣaḍviṃśatiguṇaḥ prādhānyena vivakṣitaḥ* "The quality 'twenty-six' is meant as the main factor."

The vocabulary of the *ŚB* is that of the philosophical *bhāṣya* in general. Neither ambiguous terms nor synonyms are lacking.[108] The compounds are not yet extensively formed.[109] Let us notice those endings in *mātra* "only, purely," and in *artha* "for the sake of ..." The stages in thought and debate are well marked by brief questions *(kim, kiṃ kāraṇam, kutaḥ),* by words indicating objections (*nanu* for introducing them, *iti cet* at the end), conclusions *(tasmāt),* explanations *(tathā hi),* restrictive or cumulative shades of meaning *(api),* shades of opposition *(punar).* The word *iti* is everywhere found with subtle values. An idea may be expressed positively and negatively side by side. The negative particle may open the sentence and bear on the final verb, the interval being filled with the content of the negation *(na ... iti vaktavyam).* At places, the argument is illustrated by stock examples and comparisons.

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[108] Ambiguity of the words *puruṣa* and *saṃjñā* in *ŚB* on *MS* 1, 1, 5 *(ātmavāda),* see STRAUSS 1932: 522n., 524n.; of *padārtha,* DIXIT 1983: 5. Synonyms: *VID-GHAṬ* "to exist," *GṚH-GAM* passive "to be understood," *abhipraya-artha-viṣaya* "(object of) meaning;" *ARH-ŚAK* "to be possible" etc.

[109] We find the compound form next to the analytical one in *ŚB* on *MS* 4, 3, 4: *atha praṇayanasya godohanādisaṃbandhaṃ godohanādeś ca phalena saṃbandham vidadhāti.*

## CHAPTER III: THE GOLDEN AGE OF THE MĪMĀṂSĀ*

### § 28. Bhartṛmitra and Vindhyavāsin

Bhartṛmitra is the first Mīmāṃsaka to be placed between Ś and K, and his views are referred to and refuted by the latter. He is said to have been a positivist and irreligious thinker, who, by his wrong opinions *(apasiddhānta)*, turned away the *M* out of the orthodoxy. K's task will be to bring it again on the right way.[110] As to Vindhyavāsin, he is quoted by K in the *ŚV* (*ātmavāda* chapter, 62), but he rather appears as a master of the *Sāṃkhya* school.[111]

### § 29. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (between 600 and 700 A. D.)[112]

"Lord" *(Bhaṭṭa)* K is not only a great Mīmāṃsaka, but also one of the most significant scholars and thinkers of India. According to Tāranātha, the Tibetan author of a "History of Buddhism in India," K took upon himself the mission of repelling Buddhism, that was popular in his days, and of fighting one of its famous champions, Dignāga, of the *Sautrāntika-vijñānavāda* school.[113]

K was a contemporary of king Sron-btsansgam-po who ruled over Tibet ca. 609–649. On the other hand, Bhavabhūti, present at the court of Yaśovarman of Kanauj ca. 730 A. D., calls himself K's pupil. But is he a direct one? In any case, we could take for granted that his master lived between 600 and 700 A. D. He might have been born in the North of India (Mithilā?), but moved towards the South. Anyhow, he had some knowledge of the Dravidian languages.[114]

His main works, the *Ślokavārttika (ŚV)* and the *Tantravārttika (TV)*, are impressive and rightly famous. We shall study them first, before devoting a paragraph to the *Ṭupṭīkā* and the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*.

### § 30. The *Ślokavārttika (ŚV)*

This "Critical explanation in *ślokas*"[115] is a wide-ranging commentary (3348 *kārikās* "versus memoriales") on the first 36 *sūtras* of the *ŚB*, viz., the *Tarkapāda*. It is a masterpiece of Indian epistemology and dialectics, and a summary of the contem-

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* For this section, I derived profit from the informations and suggestions of Prof. L. SCHMITHAUSEN, Hamburg.

[110] A. S. SASTRI 1961: Bhūmikā, 10; MISHRA 1964[2]: 19–20.

[111] KANE 1977[2]: 1376.

[112] SHARMA 1980: 13–14.

[113] Stories about these polemics in the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* of Mādhava (14th c.), see § 57. The Bauddhas are quoted, e.g., in *ŚV* 4 (= *pratyakṣasūtra*) 40; 7 *(nirālambanavāda)* 14.

[114] In *TV* on *MS-ŚB* 1, 3, 10, he carries on a discussion about Tamil words, see K. KUNJUNNI RAJA, in Annals of Oriental Research, University of Madras, XXVIII 1978, 1ff.

[115] A *śloka* is a group of 4 octosyllables in 2 hemistichs. *Kārikā* simply applies to a terse expression of thought.

poraneous speculative thought. The account is definitely polemic, for K strains to bring back the *M* into the heart of the orthodoxy (*ŚV* I, 11).

The first of the 25 chapters is the *pratijñāsūtra* "Aphorism(s) about the positions to be proved," actually a gloss of *MS* 1, 1, 1. Chapters 2 *(codanāsūtra),* 3 *(nimittasūtra)* and 4 *(pratyakṣasūtra)* bear on *MS* 1, 1, 2; 3; 4. But the bulk of the *ŚV* is a survey of *MS* 1, 1, 5, in 18 chapters, the titles of which are partially[116] those of portions in the *adhikaraṇa* of Ś (§ 25). Chapters 23 *(śabdanityatādhikaraṇa),* 24 *(vākyādh.)* and 25 *(vedāpauruṣeyatādh.)* deal with *MS-ŚB* 1, 1, 6–36.[117]

In the following analysis, the contents of the *ŚV* are set out according to the importance of the issues.

§ 31. Theory of knowledge and polemics with the Buddhists

In answer to the devastating criticism of the Buddhists, particularly against the theory of perceptive knowledge (see also § 34),[118] and in defence of the Veda as the source of *dharma,* K develops the theory of the *svataḥprāmāṇya* "intrinsic validity"[119]: each cognition is a priori right, while its faultiness should require a proof. For if a cognition was not deemed right by itself, it would call for another one as its proof, and this one, in its turn, for a third. Hence the defect of *regressus in infinitum.* A right cognition is congruent with its object in the outside world, on account of the good quality of the sense-organs. That such a cognition cannot be contradicted, is confirmed by practice, and, if it is contributing something new, it is entirely valid.[120]

This "intrinsic validity" is transferred from the perceptive area to the word of the Veda *(śabda).* All these ideas are included in *ŚV* 2 (= *codanāsūtra*). A passage reads as follows:

> "46 (Objection) Therefore, inasmuch as there is no human agency – or even if there is any such, because of the impossibility of any purity of it – there can be no locus standi for the injunction; hence a character of validity *(pramāṇatva)* cannot rightly be said to belong to it.
>
> 47 (Reply) You must understand that validity *(prāmāṇya)* is intrinsic *(svataḥ)* in all means of right knowledge *(pramāṇa)* ...
>
> 49–51 If, even on the birth (appearance) of conception, the object thereof be not comprehended until the purity of its cause had been ascertained by other means, then in all cases

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[116] The 5 chapters of the *ŚV* concerning *pramāṇa-s* other than perception (described in ch. 4) are the *anumāna-, śabda-, upamāna-, arthāpatti-* and *abhāva-pariccheda* (see § 25. 4). The objections set forth in the *citrākṣepa-* and *saṃbandhākṣepavāda* (ch. 14–15, see 25. 5–6) are refuted in *ŚV,* ch. 20–21: *saṃbandhākṣepa-* and *citrākṣepaparihāra* (*parihāra* = confutation).

[117] The text of the *ŚV* offers variants depending on whether it comes from southern or northern manuscripts. In *ŚV* 16 = *sphoṭavāda* 133, the Benares *MS* reads *dharmasiddhitaḥ,* that of Madras *dharmyasiddhitaḥ* (Biardeau 1958: 50). Divergent readings also occur in the *ŚV* quotations by Śāntarakṣita (§ 38).

[118] K presents the Buddhist approach, e.g., in *ŚV* 8 = *śūnyavāda* 40: "... There can be no mutual contact between the object and the cognition ..." See also Rani 1982.

[119] Schmithausen 1965: 99; D'sa 1980: 180ff. *Prāmāṇya* derives from *pramāṇa,* which means either "means of (right) knowledge" or "cognition" proceeding from its use.

[120] Schmithausen 1965: 191ff. It is worth distinguishing the "true cognition" and the "valid" one, the *smṛti* and the *vijñāna.* The former supplies us with nothing new and thus cannot be called "valid," *ŚV* 5 = *autpattikasūtra* 11; Bhatt 1962: 88–89; D'sa 1980: 182.

we should have to wait for the production of another conception from a next source; for until its purity has been ascertained, the conception would be equal to nothing (= false). And this second conception too would be valid only on the ascertainment of the purity of its cause, and so there would be no limit ...

79 Just as (in the case of the ear-perception) the ground of support may be ascertained to be an other perception by the same sense, so too we may postulate a similar support in the case of the Veda also.

80 Therefore the conception *(vijñāna)* that has been firmly (and fully) brought about, and does not stand in need of any support of other conceptions must be accepted to be (truly) valid *(pramāṇa)*" (tr. JHĀ 1983a[2]: 28–29, 33 with slight modifications).

§ 32. To undermine the Buddhist belief in the (purely human) speech of the Buddha, K is willing "to prove logically that the Vedic statements are *pramāṇam* with regard to *dharma*" (last *śloka* of the *ŚV*) and wonders what gives the Vedic speech its features. Error *(mithyātva)* is unknown in the Veda, not because it has been proclaimed by an omniscient *(sarvajña)* person or a trustworthy human being *(āpta)* – suppositions that raise K's scorn –,[121] but because it has no origin at all: neither human nor divine. The Veda is *apauruṣeya*[122] (see also § 26).

Whereas human speech may be unreliable, being proclaimed by somebody ignorant or unfaithful, such a risk is avoided in Vedic speech *(śabda)* for

"The cognition *(buddhi)* produced by a Vedic statement is a *pramāṇa* because its origin is due to faultless causes ... (and) because it is born of statements which are not said by untrustworthy persons *(anāpta)*, and because, like the declaration of a trustworthy person, it is not nullified at different times, places etc." (*ŚV* 2 = *codanāsūtra* 184–185; tr. D'SA 1980: 192 with slight modifications).

§ 33. Other epistemological contributions

a. K wonders whether cognition knows its object and itself together, and replies that we are aware of the object but never of the cognition which is only discovered through an *arthāpatti* "presumption," which takes place afterwards.[123]

b. *K* describes cognition as an act aiming at its object, but vanishing as soon as the latter is reached and known.[124]

"Not even for a moment does (the cognition) continue to exist ... Therefore the only operation of cognition with regard to the objects consists in its being produced ..." (*ŚV* 4 = *pratyakṣasūtra* 55–56; tr. JHĀ 1983a[2]: 76).

"While functioning towards the comprehension of the object *(arthasaṃvitti)*, the idea does not approach itself (= does not render itself comprehensible) ... hence it cannot be its own illuminator (or manifester) ... If one idea were to be comprehended by another (idea), then there would be no end of (such ideas) *(anavasthā)*" (*ŚV* 8 = *śūnyavāda* 184–187; tr. JHĀ 1983a[2]: 170).

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[121] The attacks of K against the omniscience of either the Buddha or the *āpta* (according to the *Nyāya*) occur in *ŚV* 2 = *codanāsūtra* 117ff. BIARDEAU 1964: 346; D'SA 1980: 192ff.

[122] There is no creator of the Veda, for he has never been seen and nobody remembers him, D'SA 1980: 197. *ŚV* 20 = *saṃbandhākṣepaparihāra* 42ff. demonstrate his inexistence.

[123] BIARDEAU 1958: 22–23; BHATT 1962: 55; SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 195; as to the position of the Prābhākaras, below § 43.

[124] BHATT 1962: 66.

In these matters, *K* is at the same time opposed to a number of Buddhists, since he admits the relationship of the idea with an external object, and a follower of them, when he regards the cognition as a momentary act.

c. In accounting for falsity/error *(mithyātva),* non-perception *(ajñāna)* and doubt *(saṃśaya)* (*ŚV* 2 = *codanāsūtra* 54–55), K asserts that even the object of error (e.g., a dream) is or has been a real object, but is grasped in a different form.[125] In this view, the mind is the victim as well as the agent of error, whereas, in the Prābhākara doctrine (§ 43), it is, so to say, a mere spectator of two cognitions the mixture of which is wrong.[126]

§ 34. Polemics about perception

The treatment of the main *pramāṇa,* that is *pratyakṣa* "perception," is the opportunity of a new clash between K and the Buddhists. In conformity with *MS-ŚB* 1, 1, 4, K argues that perception, at the outset, is simple, viz. it grasps mere existents without differentiating in them specific (= particular) and generic (= universal) features:[127]

> "First of all, there is a cognition in the shape of mere observation in the abstract, which is non-qualificative ... arising purely out of the object by itself (without any specification). And at this time neither specific nor generic aspects are recognized; what is cognized is only the object, the substratum of these (generalisation and specification)" (*ŚV* 4 = *pratyakṣasūtra* 112–113; tr. JHĀ 1983 a[2]: 87 with slight modifications).

Up to this point, agreement is maintained with the Buddhist conception that regards *pratyakṣa* as free from imagination and subjective images and as unconnected with name and genus. But as soon as the mind starts analysing this non-qualificative *(nirvikalpa)* perception, the rift opens between K and his opponents. For the Buddhists, this stage is no longer perception, for any general feature, any name imposed on a perceptive content is a *kalpanā,* a mode of thought, not a mode of existence.[128] In this sense, Buddhism is an idealism. On the contrary, K is a realist. The second stage, i.e. the qualificative perception, is an explicitation of the first one, and there is no complete severance between them.

On the one hand, K turns down the Buddhist position. On the other hand, he is not prepared to accept that an extraordinary perception is granted to the *Yogin,*[129] as claimed by the Nyāya:

> "Even objects in the past and in the future, and those that are extremely subtle in character, and those at a distance, some people hold to be amenable to the sense-perception of the yogis

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[125] This theory (*ŚV* 7 = *nirālambanavāda* 108–109ff.) will be given later (by Maṇḍana Miśra) the name of *viparīta-/anyathākhyātivāda,* in contrast to the *akhyāti* of the Prābhākaras. See BHATT 1962: 100ff.; SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 202; POTTER 1977[3]: 210ff.

[126] HIRIYANNA 1968[7]: 315ff.

[127] MATILAL 1971: 78ff. It is to be noted that the objects of perception must be present, BHATT 1962: 159. On the *pratyakṣasūtra* as a whole, see DIXIT 1983: 49–58; see addendum, p. 61.

[128] BHATT 1962: 189–190. Such is the opinion of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and others, who explain perception to be only in touch with the pure individual *(svalakṣaṇa).*

[129] In general, the *M* is hostile to any *adṛṣṭārtha* "unseen entity."

and to that of the liberated souls ... The sense-perception of the yogis too cannot be any other than what is ordinarily known as such" (*ŚV* 4 = *pratyakṣasūtra* 26–28; tr. JHĀ 1983a[2]: 71–72).

§ 35. Polemics against the notion of *sphoṭa (sph.)*

The *sph.* or "global flash of comprehension" is a notion applicable to the word *(śabda/pada)* as well as to the sentence *(vākya)*.

A. The *śabda-sph.* is attacked by K in the chapters 16 (= *sphoṭavāda,* see 25.7) and 23 (= *śabdanityatādhikaraṇa* on *MS* 1, 1, 6–23) of the *ŚV*. For the *sphoṭavādin,*[130] a permanent verbal entity underlies the phonemes making up the word *(pada),* and is apprehended by the mind as a whole apart from and beyond the letters.[131] For the *varṇavādin,* namely K, this *sph.* is to be dropped as useless. The mind is able to grasp the meaning of a *pada* directly out of the phonemes/syllables *(varṇa)*,[132] provided some simple conditions are fulfilled:

"Phonemes should be accepted as being denotative of a meaning only according as they are known (conventionally and traditionally) to have the capability of expressing such meaning.

With reference to these (phonemes), subsidiary as they are to the denotation of meanings we have also to admit of the facts of their collocation, and their being uttered by a single person, and that too in a certain definite order" (*ŚV* 16 = *sphoṭavāda* 69–70; tr. JHĀ 1983a[2]: 272 with slight modifications).

By doing away with the *sph.*, K remained faithful to the doctrine of Ś, but he discarded a notion that would have conformed very well with the outlook of the *M* on the eternity of the sound, the word and the Veda.[133] Consequently, K was bound to transfer to something else, namely *śabda,*[134] the features the *sph.* was endowed with.

K firstly dwells on the *śabda* as sonic matter. He describes its physical and physiological journey from the palate of the speaker[135] up to the ear of the listener, under the shape of a vibration *(dhvani/nāda)* producing an impression *(saṃskṛti)* on the ether *(ākāśa)* inside the organ.

But *śabda* is much more than a material element or a property of the ether. It is the eternal undivided and unchangeable reality, manifested in our human world with the help of the *dhvani,* under the form of phonemes/syllables *(varṇa)*. These *varṇas* evolve in succession until the whole word is enunciated. At this moment,

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[130] Mainly Bhartṛhari (7th c.?) with whom *K* is thoroughly familiar (HALBFASS 1983: 97).

[131] D'SA 1980: 130.

[132] *ŚV* 16 = *sphoṭavāda* 69: "The very phonemes, which by their number and qualities are known as capable to denote a certain meaning, also serve to communicate the idea."

[133] FRAUWALLNER 1961a.

[134] The polysemy of *śabda* is well known and disquieting: "sound," "word," "verbal testimony," "Vedic revelation."

[135] K is silent with regard to the vocal chords. On the phonological section which is markedly related to the *vaiśeṣika* physics, see ABEGG 1923.

the last *varṇa,* together with a backglance on the previously uttered syllables, pushes the word into the realm of the meaning.[136] The relationship between the word (as a group of *varṇa*) and the meaning is also eternal,[137] but, on this point, K hardly adds anything important to what Ś had already declared.

B. *Vākya-sph.* is the name here applied to the theory stating that the sentence is the necessary framework leading to the meaning of the individual words. It goes for Prabhākara and his school under the name of *anvitārthānvayavāda* (§ 45).

The view of K is just the other way around. For him, the sentence is merely the sum of the meanings of its components, provided that their order is not overlooked. Such a theory is termed *abhihitānvayavāda.*[138] Henceforth, the topic of the sentence structure will be treated by every *mīmāṃsaka* writer.[139]

§ 36. The *ŚV* offers further considerations on

A. The *pramāṇas,*[140] in particular *anumāna* "inference" resting upon *vyāpti* "invariable concomitance," *ŚV* 9 = *anumānapariccheda* 12–13. K shows that inference proceeds from repeated experiences, but fails to explain how the passage from observed cases to a universal and necessary law is conceivable.[141] In addition to the valid *anumāna,* K sets out some "pseudo-reasons" *(hetvābhāsa, ŚV* 9, 75ff.).

He then proceeeds to examine *śabda* "verbal testimony," *upamāna* "identification," *arthāpatti* "presumption" and *anupalabdhi* "non-apprehension," i.e., the means of knowing an absence *(abhāva).* Here K is opposed to Prabhākara who puts this last means of knowledge on one side.[142]

B. The denotative power of the word in *ŚV* 17 *(ākṛtivāda)* and 19 *(vānavāda).* The word denotes the *ākṛti* "specified form," the emphasis being on the universal *(jāti/sāmānya)* more than on the individual *(vyakti).*[143] But the two aspects cannot be kept apart; on the contrary, their relationship is one of qualifier-qualified *(dharmadharmisaṃbandha).* It is on this point that K has written some of his acutest methaphysical meditations such as *ŚV* 17, 9–11, 17–18:

> "There is an eternally mutual dependence between the universal *(sāmānya)* and the particular *(viśeṣa).* For the universal is of the particulars and they are of (the universal). A universal without particulars does not exist, (it would be) like the horns of the hare. And the particulars without the universal (would be) like them too ... Therefore the difference between individual and universal is not absolute ... Hence *jāti* has to be accepted (as)

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[136] D'SA 1980: 120, 168.

[137] On the unchangeable eternity of the *varṇas* and the beginningless eternity of their sequence see D'SA 1980: 167 etc.; DIXIT 1983: 28.

[138] See *ŚV* 24 = *vākyādhikaraṇa;* D'SA 1980: 166ff.

[139] KUNJUNNI RAJA 1977: chapter 5; BIARDEAU 1956: 29ff.

[140] BHATT 1962: 206–364.

[141] BHATT 1962: 223; SOLOMON 1978: 419. K's word *vyāpti* will be superseded by the word *niyama* "necessary connection," FRAUWALLNER 1962: 88.

[142] On the notion of non-being as "different being," see SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 204.

[143] The *ākṛti* is proper to the concrete objects and lacking for the abstractions, D'SA 1980: 157. The *vanavāda* explains the difference between universal and group, DIXIT 1983: 15ff.

different from the individual capabilities and as pervading individually and collectively (the particulars). Therefore for us there is a natural property of individuals (which) is the object of a unified cognition. It may be called *sāmānyam, ākṛti, jāti* or *śakti* ... (tr. D'SA 1980: 154–155).

For K the particular and the universal blend in the unity of the individual concrete without the help of any third term such as the relation of inherence *(samavāya),* fancied by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as joining the two principles.[144]

C. The Buddhist theory of *apoha* ("exclusion"), according to which a general name has no positive import, but merely expresses a non-otherness. The word "cow" merely excluded what is non-cow.[145] Confronting Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, its upholders, K is unable to admit that the meaning of the word is nothing more than that (*ŚV* 18 = *apohavāda*), for in the *M* a purely negative entity is inconceivable.[146] Later on, the standpoint of K will be questioned by Śāntarakṣita in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (§ 38).

D. Theological and moral matters. *Mokṣa* "liberation" is hinted in *ŚV* 20 = *saṃbandhākṣepaparihāra* 108–110, K being hardly concerned with it. In *ŚV* 2 = *codanāsūtra* 79ff., occurs a discussion of the notions of *hiṃsā/ahiṃsā,* in rejoinder to the Buddhist and Jaina criticism against the violence and the killing inherent in the animal sacrifice.[147] According to K, a ritualistic *hiṃsā,* if sanctioned by a *vidhi,* cannot be sinful. Conversely, *ahiṃsā* is not a rationally and morally self-evident rule. The "voice of conscience" is strictly subordinate to the Veda. This view will be criticized in the *Syādvādamañjarī* of the Jaina Malliṣeṇa (13th c.).

§ 37. The *Tantravārttika (TV)* "Critical Explanation of the Doctrine" comments, in a mixture of prose and *kārikās,* the *MS* from 1, 1, 37 onwards up to the end of the third *adhyāya.*[148] Owing to its bulk, this work has not yet been studied in detail,[149] but we may discover therein many interesting views on different topics.

The first excerpt is at once grammatical and metaphysical. It belongs to the extensive comment upon *MS-ŚB* 2, 1, 1 *(bhāvādhikaraṇa).* K is outlining the distinction between transitive and intransitive roots, as well as the one between act and substance, offering incidentally his contribution to the doctrine of the *bhāvanā* (§ 26).[150]

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[144] SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 244; DRAVID 1972: 55ff.

[145] POTTER 1977[3]: 188; DRAVID 1972: 264ff.; VETTER 1964: 47ff., especially 60–61; DIXIT 1983: 13–15; HATTORI 1974.

[146] DRAVID 1972: 276–277; see above note 142.

[147] HALBFASS 1983: 2ff., especially 8.

[148] According to KANE 1977[2]: 1198n., the *TV* would have been written later than 650, what does not tally with the opinion of FRAUWALLNER 1962: 89–90, stating that the *Bṛhattīkā* (§ 38) would be K's last work and would date back to 630–640.

[149] But it was frequently commented upon in the past centuries. A list of these commentaries in HARIKAI 1983/1: 3–5.

[150] On the passage, see FRAUWALLNER 1938; the discussion is pursued by his commentators PSM (§ 55) and Someśvara (§ 50) as well as by MM (§ 55) in his *Bhāvanāviveka.*

"There are certain roots added to which a conjugational affix signifies only that action of the agent which ends in his acquiring his own existence, e.g., 'is, exists' and the like. In the case of other roots, when the agent is an already accomplished entity, the action signified is that which brings about the existence of something else, e.g., 'sacrifices, gives, cooks' and the like. And the word *vyāpāra* 'action' signifies only a particular substance – endowed with peculiar potencies, moved in its pristine character, having a mixed nature, having an existence in the past and the future – as moved from its former position and not having reached the next. And in the case of some verbs it is the agent himself that is cognized as being in this position, while in that of others, where the agent is a well-established entity *(siddha)*, it is something else ... When however the agent is a well-established entity and functions towards the fulfilment of something else, then he is spoken of as *karoti* 'does.' The verb *karoti* being transitive *(sakarmaka)*, unless there is something else to be accomplished, the sense of the verb is not complete ... We come to the conclusion that the nominative *(kartṛ)* of the action 'to be' is the objective *(karman)* of the action *karoti* ..." (Tr. JHĀ 1983b[2]: 476; the text in *MK* 6, 3007b, 19ff.).

The second excerpt is taken from the comment upon *MS-ŚB* 1, 3, 1–2 dealing with the value of the *smṛtis* (traditional codes of conduct) and the *ācāra* (human and unwritten custom). These pages will have a great impact on the indigenous juridical literature.[151]

K is faced with a difficult issue. In order to justify the importance of the *Manusmṛti* for the Aryans, it is tempting to advocate for it a Vedic background, namely some lost *śākhā:*

"And in the case of Manu, it is quite possible that there should be Vedic injunctions that served as the source of his conceptions ... For this reason, it becomes possible for the three higher castes to be connected with the Veda ... It would be far more reasonable to assume the *smṛtis* to have their source in the injunctions contained in such portions of the Veda as have been lost; nor is such disappearance of the Veda impossible, as even now we find the Veda losing much of itself, either through the negligence and laziness of the students, or through the gradual disappearance of people versed in it ..." (Tr. JHĀ 1983b[2]: 112–113; the text in *MK* 7, 4436a, 9ff.).

But if such an inference is legitimate in the case of Manu, how could the Buddhists be prevented from resorting to it for the sake of their unorthodox scriptures?

"If it be assumed that they have a basis in the portions of the Veda that have been lost, then the authority of the *smṛtis* of the Bauddhas could be also established by means of a similar assumption. And people would utilize the authority of such assumed Vedic texts now lost in support of anything they might wish to resort to ..." (Tr. JHĀ 110; the text in *MK* 7, 4435a, 19ff.).

The answer is that of a staunch but socially short-sighted upholder of the orthodoxy:

"It cannot be urged that any and every theory could declare itself to be based upon such (Vedic) authority, because such lost Vedic texts can be assumed only on the ground that without such texts the firm conviction and remembrance of highly respectable people of the three higher castes remain inexplicable ..." (Tr. JHĀ 113; the text in *MK* 7, 4436a, 30–33).

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151 KANE 1977[2]: 1257ff., 1973[2]: 827–828ff.; HALBFASS 1983: 94.

§ 38. The *Ṭupṭīkā* and the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*[152]

The *Ṭupṭīkā* "Gloss (named) Ṭup ("small"?; abridgement of *anuṣ-ṭubh?*)" is a scanty comment upon the last nine books of the *ŚB*.[153] It contains interesting passages, such as those about the *svarga* "heaven" (on *MS-ŚB* 6, 1, 1–3)[154] and about *karman* and rebirth (on *MS-ŚB* 4, 3, 28 = *MK* 3, 1328).

The *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* "Great Gloss" handles the same problems as the *ŚV*.[155] We only know it through quotations, especially those made by the Buddhist thinker Śāntarakṣita (725–785). In the last two chapters of his *Tattvasaṃgraha,* he upholds some tenets of Buddhism (e.g., the omniscience of the Buddha), and quotes verses of the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* attacking them.[156] *ŚV* and *BṬ* might have *ślokas* in common (see *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2855).[157] Judging from what we have of the *BṬ,* we feel K's thought in this work to be more synthetic and riper. Here follows a passage concerning the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda (see § 32):

> "In the case of human (statements) however, there is the uneasiness as to whether there are defects or not. In the case of the Veda however, there is for us no such fear of defects, since there is no speaker. Hence just as in the case of the Veda, the validity is predicated because of the independence (from a speaker), so, too, even in the case of something expounded by a trustworthy man, (its) intrinsic validity is easily established" (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 2894–2895; tr. D'SA 1980: 189 with slight modifications).

In the *BṬ,* K is likely also to have improved his approach to the *anumāna* (§ 36), emphasizing the necessary character of the relationship probans-probandum.

§ 39. K's language and style

K is expert at composing in *ślokas,* a literary form which prevents him form falling into his main defect, viz. verbosity. Not infrequently, a single idea is developed within one and a half verse *(kārikā),*[158] and a brief conclusion is lodged in its last quarter (with, e.g., a verb in the passive imperative, *iṣyatām* etc.). The use at places of direct speech and of the pronoun of the first person make the account more lively. K delights in the negative formulation of a thought, such as the double negation expressing an affirmation. He resorts to abstracts in *-tā/tva* and to lengthy compounds (e.g., those ending with *vyatirikta* "free from" etc.). His vocabulary is rich and he is the first to use some couples of contrasted terms not yet known as such by Ś, e.g., *uddeśyamāna-vidheya* "subject-predicate."

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[152] Generally, a *ṭīkā* is a word-to-word subcommentary, less critical than a *vārttika* and different from a work in *nibandhana* style which, according to HARIKAI 1983/1: 6, is more concerned with treating certain points than commenting on everything.

[153] The text of the *Ṭupṭīkā* as given in the *MK* is that of the *Mīmāṃsādarśanam,* ed. ABHYANKAR-JOŚI 1970–1976. *Ṭupṭīkā's* commentaries: *Tantraratna* (§ 55) and *Vārttikabharaṇa* of VENKATEŚVARA (17th c.).

[154] See VERPOORTEN 1983.

[155] FRAUWALLNER 1962. For the date of the *BṬ,* see § 37, note 148; RANI 1982: 28–29.

[156] See the *Tattvasaṃgraha,* ed. D. S(H)ASTRI 1982: vol. II, *kārikās* 2848ff. and 3128ff.

[157] FRAUWALLNER 1962: 85–86.

[158] Hence the sometimes puzzling numeration of the *kārikās* in JHĀ's translation 1983a[2].

§ 40. Conclusion

Although his work is far from being sufficiently studied, K already appears as an outstanding thinker. Perfectly informed of the contemporary doctrines, gifted with an uncommon metaphysical and dialectical skill, he pursued the tradition of the Vṛttikara (§ 11). In the ideological conflict between the *darśanas*, K managed to secure an unexpected foremost position for his school, by focusing attention in the *M* on the epistemological and grammatical issues more than on the ritualistic ones. In the *Bhāṭṭa* school which he founded obtains a stronger desire of independent thinking than in the rival school of Prabhākara.

Because of his personality, K was ready to disagree with Ś on details;[159] therefore he looks less orthodox than Prabhākara. Anyhow, he will be frequently quoted by the Buddhists (e.g., Śāntarakṣita, Ratnakīrti), the Jainas (Abhayadevasūri), the Vishnuite Yāmunācārya, the Śaivasiddhāntin Rāmakaṇṭha, the Advaitin Padmapāda, and furthermore, in the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa* or in juridical treatises such as the *Madanapārijāta* of Viśveśvara and the *Smṛticandrikā* of Devannabhaṭṭa.

§ 41. Prabhākara Miśra (between 600 and 700 A. D.)

We are ill informed about everything concerning Pr. His life remains unknown. Is his homeland Mithilā or Kerala? In favour of the former, his title *Miśra* "Esquire."[160] In favour of the latter,[161] the fact that Pr's ideas and works had difficulty in spreading into the rest of India. Now this is the case with several traditions of learning originating in medieval Kerala. Nor should we forget that the Prābhākara school of the *M* occupied, in the subsequent centuries, a prominent position in the nearby areas of Karnatic and Mahārāṣṭra.[162]

As to his age, he probably was a contemporary of K, although neither quotes the other by name. Yet a slight clue proving the existence, not necessarily of Pr and his doctrine in a strict sense, but at least of a core of ideas akin to them is the *kārikā ŚV* 2 = *codanāsūtra* 195–197, where K sets out different imports of the word *dharma*.[163] Among them is the equation *dharma* = *apūrva* which might refer to the views of Pr or somebody next to him.

On the other hand, should we take for granted that K is spoken of by Pr under the derogatory terms *anupāsitaguru* "one who has not listened to his preceptor" and

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[159] On the unorthodox exegesis of K, see GARGE 1952: 269; KANE 1973²: 704–705, 1977²: 1335.

[160] A. S. SASTRI 1961: Bhūmikā 46, 54.

[161] KUNHAN RAJA in the preface of S. K. R. SASTRI 1934; S. S. SASTRI 1967: preface II.

[162] On the "insularity" of Kerala, see HALBFASS 1983: 120; e.g., an inscription of Gadag (Karnataka) dated 1098 refers to the founding of a school for teaching Prabhākara's system, Epigraphia Indica XV 348.

[163] "We do not find the word 'duty' used in either of the following senses (1) ... (5) that of *apūrva* ... Nor can we recognize the *apūrva* as anything different from heaven and sacrifice, either in the shape of the means (sacrifice) or of the end (heaven) or any form other than these" (tr. JHĀ 1983a²: 51).

*apanyāyavādin* "upholder of wrong rules?"[164] Recall too that the followers of Pr themselves have given their master the names of *Jaratprabhākara* "Old Prabhākara" and *Guru* with a depreciating shade.[165] At any rate, Pr must have preceded MM (§§ 47, 49), who knows of his philosophy and is usually said to have lived around 700.[166]

§ 42. Prabhākara's works

On the *MS-ŚB* Pr has written a *Laghvī(ṭīkā)* "Short (gloss)," also called *Vivaraṇa* and only known through secondary sources such as Rāmānujācārya (§ 58, n° 19) or Candra (§ 64);[167] and a *Bṛhatī(ṭīkā)* "Great (gloss)" or *Nibandhana,* which was likely to bear on the whole *ŚB*. But hitherto we only possess the portion extending to *adhyāya* 6, *pāda* 2, and some scanty excerpts quoted by Śālikanātha in his *ṭīkā (= Ṛjuvimalā)* on the vanished part of the text.[168]

§ 43. The *Bṛhatī*. Epistemological views

The most significant and famous contribution of Pr to Indian thought is an epistemological theory of error, known as *akhyāti* (§ 49) "non manifestation (of a memory as such)." According to it, error *(bhrānti)* which induces somebody to take a shell to be a silvery object or a rope to be a snake originates in the non-cognition *(agrahaṇa)* of a non-relation. To a completely inert mind[169] perceptual informations occur, all of them being true. The mistake is located in their combination, *this* shell here and now being apprehended as united with the memory of *that* silvery thing.[170] Unable to discriminate, the mind falls into error, which is, so to say, a sin of omission, an inability of fulfilling a requirement *(kāryākṣamatva),*[171] viz. not to confuse a memory and a perception:

> "When a cognition arises, grasping in its object what is similar (to a certain other thing), irrespective of the distinctive features, then (this cognition) can produce the memory of another thing which is similar to the (one perceived) in (the mind of) somebody not aware of the fact 'I remember.'"[172]

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[164] *Bṛhatī* on *MS-ŚB* 1, 1, 5 *(śabdārthasaṃbandha,* see § 25.6), the text of which occurs in *MK* 7, 3836a, 33; *Bṛhatī* on *MS-ŚB* 3, 5, 8, the text of which is given in S. S. Sastri 1964: 863. See also A. S. Sastri 1961: Bhūmikā 47–48, 51.

[165] A. S. Sastri 1961: Bhūmikā 24; Jhā 1978²: 9; Chatterjee 1979: 276.

[166] On the citations of Pr in MM, see Kane 1977²: 1193.

[167] See A. S. Sastri 1961: Bhūmikā 46; S. K. R. Sastri 1934: 2d pt 15, 28; Bhattacharya 1958: 32.

[168] All that has been published in the Madras University Sanskrit Series in 5 volumes: Ia, Ib, II, IV(!), V. There is no vol. III and no gap in the pagination between II and IV. See S. K. R. Sastri 1934 and S. S. Sastri 1962–1964–1967. The *MK* reproduces the text of the Chowkhamba edition (of A. Ch. Sastri 1929–1933), which does not go further than the *Tarkapāda.*

[169] Whereas in K's epistemology (§ 33) the mind is provided with a certain amount of power for building up concepts.

[170] Schmithausen 1965: 240; Potter 1977³: 197ff. According to MM (§§ 45ff.), *akhyāti* means also "non grasping (of a difference)."

[171] Schmithausen 1965: 206.

[172] *Bṛhatī* on *MS-ŚB* 1, 1, 5 (*vṛttikāragrantha,* see § 25.2); the text in *MK* 7, 3713a, 8–10 = A. Ch. Sastri 1929–1933: 51.

That entails the misconception of a (fresh) perception *(pratyakṣābhimāna)* where there is only a memory.

This view is not devoid of weak points,[173] and the followers of Pr will try to improve upon it. Throughout his vehement attacks against the Buddhist epistemology, Pr asserts the existence of the outside world and provides a realistic answer to the untenable Buddhist tenet that every cognition has hardly more foundation than a dream:

> "We are justified only in assuming, from a well-known effect, a cause that would make the effect possible, and not one that would destroy it; what we find in a dream is that there is a cognition of an external object; this effect can justify us in assuming – not indeed the absolute non-existence of the external object – but the real existence of such an object; as without this, the cognition would be an impossibility; as a general law, we know it to be true that that without which something else is not possible, is the cause of this latter; from this it follows that the cause of the dream cognition is some object in the external world"[174] (Tr. JHĀ 1978[2]: 25).

As far as the content of a perception is concerned, Pr deviates from the clear scheme of K (§ 33a). Over and beyond the subject *(ātman)* and the external element apprehended as a *karman,* Pr adds the thorny notion of *saṃvid. Saṃvid* seems to be the outcome *(phala)* of the act of *jñāna* in a perception, but a formless one, since, according to the *M*, cognition is *nirākāra* (§ 25.3). So it is concurrently knowable *(saṃvedya)* and not *(asaṃvedya).* Actually it is *prameya* "inferable." Nothing of it is caught except its presence.[175]

This threefold composition of *jñāna* is termed *triputīpratyakṣavāda.*

§ 44. The *Bṛhatī.* Ritual views

Pr sets forth a theory of his own about the Vedic injunction. Whereas K holds that *vidhi* prescribes an action aiming at a reward (e.g., heaven), Pr declares that it is prompting man to what is to be done, regardless of any result, somehow like a categorical imperative in the Kantian sense. Pr replaces the word *vidhi* by *niyoga* and uses *niyojya* for the person to be prompted.

> "The injunction *(niyoga)* binds *(niyuṅkte)* man to a certain action *(karman)* and not to anything desired by him; action is something ephemeral *(anitya),* and the (attainment of) heaven is not perceived immediately after (it). Hence it is preferable to accept the sacrifice to be either everlasting or an embellishment *(saṃskāra)* in the agent *(ātman)* or the favour of the deity, but it is wrong to declare that (the reward is obtained) by doing *apūrva* ..."

This view was a *pūrvapakṣa* (as shown by the context); the *siddhānta* yet goes further:

> "... What it *(= niyoga)* really does is to bind man *(puruṣa)* to exertion *(ārambha),* not to action. And the particular action (denoted by the root) is (only) the object of that exertion ...

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[173] SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 207ff.; POTTER 1977[3]: 199–200.

[174] *Bṛhatī* on 1, 1, 5 (*nirālambanavāda,* see § 25.3); the text in *MK* 4, 2369a, 21ff. = S. K. R. SASTRI 1934: 70.

[175] *Bṛhatī* on *MS-ŚB* 1, 1, 5 (*śūnyavāda,* see § 25.3); the text in *MK* 7, 3940b = S. K. R. SASTRI 1934: 74ff. On this issue, see JHĀ 1964[2]: 49–50; SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 210–211; SOLOMON 1969: 432 (clear); CHATTERJEE 1979: 267ff. (somewhat confuse).

As this (exertion) occurs in somebody desiring heaven, this latter proceeds from the former ..."[176] (tr. JHĀ 1978[2]: 160 with modifications).

For all the obscurity of thought, it is worth noting that heaven is more a product than an incentive or a final cause. The *niyoga* shows what is to be done *(kārya),*[177] and the *kārya* also could be regarded as a means of performing the injunction.[178]

As to *apūrva,* generally considered in the *M* as the result of the ritual procedure, Pr is more sparing than K in resorting to it. Wherever he spots a visible outcome, he puts on one side the *apūrva* which amounts to a passage into the invisible sphere.[179]

§ 45. Disagreements between Pr and K[180]

Both of them are true upholders of the *M* and agree on the main tenets of the system. This common background should never be forgotten, even when the emphasis is shifted to discrepancies which contributed to the origin of the *Prābhākara* and *Bhāṭṭa* schools. These discrepancies refer to

A. minor ritual problems, e.g., regarding *MS-ŚB* 3, 5, 23ff. *(udgātṛcamasabhakṣādhikaraṇa).* Here the problem arises whether the *subrahmaṇya* (one of the Vedic priests) is entitled to drink *soma* with his colleagues. Ś says yes; K says no. Pr follows Ś; MM (§§ 47ff.) will agree with K.[181]

B. the more significant issue of the order *(krama)* of the sacrificial acts. According to Pr, *krama* is not within the purview of the injunction; according to K and his followers, it is.[182]

C. the grammatical relationship between words and sentence. For Pr, the former evidence their meanings merely in the context of the latter. It is the *anvitārthābhidhānavāda.*[183] For the opposite viewpoint of K, see § 35B.

D. the category of similarity *(sādṛśya),* which is still more autonomous in Pr than in K, and has its own ontological status, different from that of universal *(sāmānya).*[184]

E. the list of *pramāṇas.* Pr, unlike K, rules out of it the *(abhāva/-)anupalabdhi* "(inexistence/-)non-apprehension," because the mind is merely able to grasp positive

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[176] *Bṛhatī* on *MS-ŚB* 2, 1, 5; the text in S. S. SASTRI 1962: 319ff.

[177] JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 178–179. The distinction *kārya-anuṣṭheya* overlaps that between *kratu-* and *puruṣa-artha* (§ 18.d), JHĀ 1978[2]: 185.

[178] The same doctrine is maintained by a Prābhākara opponent in the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja, at the end of the explanation of *Brahmasūtra* 1, 1, 1, see LACOMBE 1938: 153ff. The account is here not much clearer than in the *Bṛhatī* itself.

[179] JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 177–181; 1978[2]: 186ff. For an account of *apūrva* in K and Pr, see HALBFASS 1983.

[180] A survey of these in K. S. R. SASTRI 1937: Intr. XXXff.; MISHRA 1964[2]: 28–29; S. S. SASTRI 1958–1959.

[181] A. S. SASTRI 1961: Bhūmikā 48; JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 552.

[182] JHĀ 1978[2]: 202.

[183] *Bṛhatī* on *MS-ŚB* 1, 1, 25; the text in *MK* 6, 3456ff., especially 3457b, 34. See also KUNJUNNI RAJA 1977[3]: 199.

[184] N. BANDYOPADHYAY, The concept of Similarity in Indian Philosophy, Journal of Indian Philosophy 10 (1982), 239ff.

entities. The non-apprehension of the jar defended by K is substituted by the apprehension of the mere place where the jar ought to have stood.[185]

§ 46. Conclusion

The whole thought of Pr is indebted to his ritualistic bias and his conviction that the sacrificial act prevails over everything. Therefore if his theory of the phrase states that the grammatical components draw their meaning from the whole, it is because, in the sacrificial performance, each tiny operation, when singled out, loses its sense.[186] As a matter of fact, Pr is not concerned with the things *(vastu)* in themselves, but only with their relation to a would-be sacrifice.

The epistemology of Pr is a thorough-going realism,[187] and thus, like every extreme position, revolutionary.

As far as the method is concerned, Pr usually focuses his survey on the main aspects of a problem, without dwelling on the details. That explains his terse language in which the long compounds are rather infrequent, the sentence is generally short (like that of Ś), the dialectic particles are scarcer than in K.

Finally, some words seem to be frequently used and to be typical of Pr: *bāḍham* "surely" (instead of *satyam*); *rāddhānta* instead of *siddhānta; prayukti, (a)vivakṣita, saṃvid* and so forth. Several Mīmāṃsakas have vindicated the views of the Guru. They are named *Prābhākara* (see chart § 67), and are playing a role of objectors in philosophical works of various origin, e.g., in the *Pañcapādikā*[188] of the Vedāntin Padmapāda (mid-8th c.) as well as in the treatises of MM (§§ 47ff.). The *Bṛhatī* is even quoted in a famous law-text, the *Mitākṣara.*[189]

§ 47. Maṇḍana Miśra (about 700)

Nothing is known concerning the birthplace (Mithilā?) or the life of MM, probably an elder contemporary of Śaṅkara. The view reported by the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* that he and Sureśvara[190] were the same person and that the latter name was given to MM after his conversion to the *Vedānta* is today discredited.[191]

MM stands aloof in the *M,* not only because he has been writing *Vedānta* works (§ 49), but also in view of his peculiar method. He indeed excels in dealing with just one doctrinal point as clearly and thoroughly as possible, in a short treatise, and this fact brings him closer to the occidental way of philosophizing. On the other hand, he never founded a school of his own, and a follower of his is hardly to be found.

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[185] Jhā 1978²: 72; C. L. Tripathi 1977; K. K. Chakrabarti, The Nyāya-Vaiseṣika Theory of Negative Entities, Journal of Ind. Phil. 6 (1978), 132.

[186] Biardeau 1956: introd. XII–XIII.

[187] Potter 1977³: 200.

[188] See the translation Venkataramiah 1948.

[189] II 114 quoted Kane 1973²: 550.

[190] The author of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* and so on, see Potter 1983², under the name Sureśvara.

[191] See the bibliography of the controversy in Thrasher 1979: 129ff. Mishra 1964²: 29, Kane 1977²: 1194 and Kuppuswami Sastri 1937 are against the identification.

§ 48. The *Mīmāṃsā* works of MM are

a. the *Bhāvanāviveka* "The discrimination of the *bhāvanā*," a collection of 60 *kārikās* with a gloss by MM himself.[192] It takes up the discussion that K had initiated on *MS-ŚB* 2, 1, 1. MM, while paying his homage to the master, is subtly modifying the doctrine of this latter. K stated that both verbal root *(prakṛti)* and optative affix were on the side of the *bhāvanā* (§§ 26, 37), of the action. For MM, the affix alone has to be spoken of as an action prompter. On the contrary, the root is a well-established entity *(labdhātman),* belonging more to the being than to the becoming.[193]

b. the *Vidhiviveka* "The discrimination of the injunction," 40 *kārikās* with auto-commentary.[194] It scrutinizes the key notion of *vidhi* which prompts man to action because it is contributory to a benefit *(iṣṭasādhanatva);* as such, it is different from the *prābhākara niyoga,* a pure categorical imperative (§ 44). As to the compulsory power of the *vidhi,* it proceeds from something similar to *pratibhā* "intuition." This term, borrowed from Bhartṛhari, occurs in the following passage:

> "Since distant speech is the cause of intuition *(pr.)* in the baby or the bird, because of the continuity of the recurring impression (*bhāvanā* with its non-ritual import), why not admit that the knowledge of the means is also such (a cause of intuition) through an incitation or a prohibition" (see Biardeau 1969: 89; the text in *MK* 6, 3615b).

Some classical epistemological debates also occur in this treatise.

c. the *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā* is a summary of the *ŚB* without personal contribution of MM.[195]

d. the *Sphoṭasiddhi* "The demonstration of the *sphoṭa,*" 37 *kārikās* with a *vṛtti* by MM himself,[196] is a discussion between a *varṇavādin* and a *sphoṭavādin* mainly on the *śabda-sphoṭa* (§ 35). The joined citations from Bhartṛhari and K typify the double inspiration of MM. Dissatisfied by the *Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsaka* doctrine stating the meaning to be conveyed by the phonemes, MM is inclined to adopt the *sphoṭa* as a device – of reducing a variety of audible concrete sounds into the unity of the act of comprehension and – of making, thus, speech a genuine *pramāṇa.* As usually with MM, the account is interspersed with incisive statements of philosophical and logical purport.

§ 49. Even in his *Vedānta* treatises, MM is greatly indebted to the *M.* In the *Vibhramaviveka,*[197] he wages war, in the name of K, against his perennial opponent, the *Prābhākara* whose theory of error he names *akhyāti* (§ 43), a term he was probably

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[192] Edition Jhā 1922–1923; see Ihara 1984.

[193] Frauwallner 1938: 186–188; Cardona 1975: 261–262.

[194] Edition T. S. Tailanga 1907.

[195] Edition Dh. Sastri 1930.

[196] Edition and French translation Biardeau 1958; English tr. K. A. S. Iyer 1966.

[197] Edition with a German tr. Schmithausen 1965. In this short tract, we meet for the first time the names of several theories of error: the Yogācāra *ātmakhyāti;* the Madhyamaka (and to some extent, Vedāntic) *asatkhyāti;* the *anyathākhyāti* of the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsā.

the first to coin. In the *Brahmasiddhi,*[198] the third chapter is a lengthy analysis of the chief *mīmāṃsaka* concept of *vidhi,* but, here, it could be seen how MM goes further than the *Mīmāṃsā* positions and improves upon them in a Vedāntic sense.

To a *pūrvapakṣin* claiming:

> "The natural capacity of speech entirely resides in what is to be done."

MM replies in the *siddhānta:*

> "No, because through what is to be done, it is the knowledge of a well-established entity that one seeks."

What henceforth matters for MM is no longer the action taking place in the *yajña,* but, preferably, the understanding *(prekṣā)* of a corpus of bliss-giving truths.[199]

[198] French tr. and commentary BIARDEAU 1969; German tr. of chapter 1 VETTER 1969. According to THRASHER 1979: 118, the work contains 15 quotations of the *ŚV* and one of the *TV.*

[199] See BIARDEAU 1969: 83, 123. Concerning the influence of the *M* on Śaṅkara, see MOGHE 1984: ch. 1. See also n. 62.

## CHAPTER IV: THE AGE OF THE SUB-COMMENTATORS

§ 50. Three commentators of Kumārila

A. Umbeka/Bhaṭṭombeka (between 700 and 750)[200] is a shadowy personality, sometimes held to be identical with MM or Bhavabhūti. Nothing is known about him, except his commenting upon K's *Ślokavārttika*[201] and MM's *Bhāvanāviveka.*[202] He is earlier than Kamalaśīla (740–795), the interpreter of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (§ 38), who names him Uveyaka.

His *Tātparyaṭīkā* on the *ŚV* provides us with epistemological views regarding the *prāmāṇya,* the "validity" of knowledge.[203]

B. Sucarita Miśra and Someśvara, though subsequent (12th c.?), deserve to be mentioned here. The former wrote an extensive commentary of K's *ŚV:* the *Kāsikā.*[204] The latter is the author of the *Nyāyasudhā* or *Rāṇaka,*[205] where he presents himself as a lucid interpreter of his master's thought.[206]

§ 51. Śālikanātha Miśra (between 800 and 950)

No significant information is available about the life of ŚN, but, as he quotes two verses of MM and is himself quoted by Vācaspati Miśra, he must have lived between them.[207] His two *Pañcikās* or "Elaborate Explanation(s)" have been published.[208] These are the *Ṛjuvimalapañcikā* "The right and clear elaborate explanation," a phrase by phrase comment upon the *Bṛhatī* (§§ 42ff.) of Prabhākara;[209] the *Prakaraṇapañcikā* "The elaborate explanation of the chapters (of Vedic science)."[210]

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[200] MISHRA 1964[2]: 31–32; KANE 1977[2]: 1194. For THRASHER 1979: 138, U's activity takes place between 760 and 790.

[201] In the *Ślokavārttikavyākhyātātparyaṭīkā* published by S. K. R. SASTRI 1971[2] and only covering the first 13 chapters (up to *sphoṭavāda*) out of the 25 contained in the *ŚV.* The other part of the gloss is composed by Bhaṭṭaputra Jayamiśra and is called *śarkarikā,* RANI 1982: 33.

[202] Edition JHĀ 1922–1923.

[203] SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 258–260.

[204] Ed. K. Sambasiva SASTRI–V. A. Ramaswami SASTRI 1926–1943. For his doctrine, see BHATT 1962: passim. For RANI 1982: 34, the work is datable ca. 1000.

[205] MISHRA 1964[2]: 42. Ed. M. SASTRI 1902–1909. Excerpts of it are quoted passim in *MK.*

[206] FRAUWALLNER 19(38)–1982[2]: 196ff. It is not impossible that Someśvara was earlier than PSM (§ 54) (EDGERTON 1929: intr. 21). According to HARIKAI 1983/1: 4–5, PSM and Someśvara disagree on certain topics.

[207] MISHRA 1964[2]: 32–33: before the 9th c.; A. S. SASTRI 1961: intr. IX: between 780 and 825, after Prajñākaragupta, a Buddhist commentator of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika,* quoted by ŚN; SCHMITHAUSEN 1963: 115n: a contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra.

[208] Besides, ŚN wrote a *Dīpaśikhā* on Pr's *Laghvī* (§ 42), still unpublished, and a *Bhāṣyapariśiṣṭa* on *ŚB, pāda* 1, see S. K. R. SASTRI 1934, second part.

[209] Edd. A. CH. SASTRI 1929 (reproduced in *MK*); S. K. R. SASTRI 1934; S. S. SASTRI 1962–1964–1967.

[210] Ed. A. S. SASTRI 1961 with the *Nyāyasiddhi* of Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (date?), an incomplete commentary covering the first six chapters of the *Pañcikā.*

§ 52. The *Prakaraṇapañcikā (Pp)*

This important book has not the form of a commentary but contains a series of fourteen discussions – with at places the Buddhist Dharmakīrti (600–660) as the opponent – on *mīmāṃsā* themes dealt with from the *prābhākara* point of view.

Ch. 1 *(Śāstramukha)* about *MS* 1, 1, 1 (quoted § 54. A), wonders why the teaching of the *M* is relevant and when it has to take place in the life of a young Brahmin.

Ch. 2 *(Nītipatha, 50 ślokas)* denies the Buddhist theory which states that there is no relation *(asaṃsparśitā)* between word *(śabda)* and object/meaning *(artha)*.

Ch. 3 *(Nayavīthi, 77 śl.)* deals with right knowledge and attempts to survey every kind of error *(akhyāti)*. Knowledge as such is always right; it simply reflects an object without adding anything to it;[211] error is never positive delusion but only a lack, a want.

Ch. 4 *(Jātinirṇaya)*[212] on the notion of *jāti* "universal," including the widest "universal," namely *sattā* "being," also briefly on *anvayavyatireka* "(law of) co-presence and co-absence,"[213] *saṃvid* (§ 43) and *avayava-avayavibhāva* "whole-part(s) relationship."

Ch. 5 *(Amṛtakalā, 73 śl.)*: the nature of the *pramāṇas* accepted by Pr.

Ch. 6. *(Pramāṇapārāyaṇa)* is a detailed analysis in 6 subsections of the classical *pramāṇas* (*pratyakṣa* and so on, § 36) with criticism of the rival viewpoints, e.g., those of Buddhism about *anumāna* and of Vaiśeṣika about *upamāna*. ŚN concludes by turning down the *bhāṭṭa* defence of the *abhāva-anupalabdhi* as the sixth *pramāṇa* (§ 36). A short passage dealing with the *nirvikalpaka/savikalpaka jñāna* reads as follows:[214]

> "In the first time, the perception reaches generic and specific aspects, when it knows two objects. But in absence of another object that is compared, it does not know (the first one) in its generic and specific aspects ... The non-qualificative (= non-conceptual perception) has as its object the generic and specific (joined). The qualificative (= conceptual perception), depending on the former, grasps two objects, that is the nature of the generic and that of the specific. (Objection) The sense-organ is not able to bring nearer a second object ... How does what is featured by the generic and the specific become object of perception? Answer: It is the subject *(ātmā)* which ..., bringing nearer another object, can apprehend through the sense-organ the (first) object with its generic-specific nature" (text in A. S. Sastri 1961: 163–165).

Ch. 7 *(Vimalāñjana)*: the eternal relationship between word and meaning is taken into account and on the same occasion, the existence of the Īśvara is denied.

Ch. 8 *(Tattvāloka)* concerns *ātman* and *mokṣa*, the latter meaning

> "... the absolute cessation of the body caused by the disappearance of all *dharma* and *adharma*. For, under the hold of *dharma* and *adharma*, the individual soul transmigrates throughout the lives ... The one who, rid of the transmigration and its evils ... is striving for liberation, is delivered by destroying every trace of *karma* with the help of self-knowledge

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[211] Schmithausen 1965: 264.

[212] Given in *MK* 3, 1767ff.

[213] This method of logical analysis enables us to ascertain which entities have a (causal) relation with each other. It sounds like the *modus tollens* of the mediaeval syllogisms.

[214] Schmithausen 1963; Van Buitenen, ed.-transl. of Rāmānuja's *Vedārthasaṃgraha*, Poona 1956, 204.

enjoined by *(Chāndogya-upaniṣad* 8, 15, 1) 'He will not return again.' The non-returning-again is not mentioned as an (exclusively) informative statement *(arthavāda),* because self-knowledge is not subserving something else. In the case of dependence on something else, a reference to reward is adduced by the maxim-of-the-(ladle-)of-*parṇa*-wood as a pure informative statement ..." (text in A. S. Sastri 1961: 341–342).

Typical of the *M* are here 1. the treatment of theological utterances with the help of an exegetical phraseology. An *arthavāda* sentence (§ 20) would have no authoritative force, 2. the resort to an interpretative maxim[215] hinting at a complex debate of the *ŚB:* the *parṇamayīnyāya* (§ 23).

Ch. 9 *(Nyāyaśuddhi):* disproof of the *Vaiśeṣika* thesis of word production.

Ch. 10 *(Mīmāṃsājīvarakṣā)* against the Buddhist theory of the momentariness of the universe.

Ch. 11. (*Vākyārthamātṛkā* in two parts) is an account of the *anvitārthābhidhāna* versus the *abhihitānvaya* (§§ 35B and 45),[216] with further views about *niyoga* (§ 44) and *apūrva.*

Ch. 12 *(Viṣayakaraṇīya)* establishes the verb-sense as the subject and the cause of *niyoga.*

Ch. 13 and 14 are devoted to ritualistic issues. In the *Aṅgapārāyaṇa,* ŚN points out two new ways of knowing the sacrificial auxiliaries *(aṅga),* viz. the *viniyoga* and the *upādāna.*[217] The *Atideśapārāyaṇa* scrutinizes the transference of ritual details *(atideśa).*

§ 53. Without ŚN the thought of Pr would remain well-nigh impenetrable. He provided it with a solid and consistent background. That does not mean that ŚN's works are easy to understand. The *Pp* is exacting because of its peculiar vocabulary and its pregnant language. ŚN is relatively less didactic than PSM (§§ 56ff.), but he seems more at ease with the philosophical problems (e.g., the theory of knowledge) than with the ritual ones. At places, we meet a touch of humor or irony.

As the second founder of the *Prābhākara* school, ŚN deserved to be well considered by the modern (and almost unique) expert in this branch of the *M,* viz. Gaṅganātha Jhā.[218]

§ 54. The *Mīmāṃsā* in the works of some non-mīmāṃsakas

A. Padmapādācārya (ca. 750), one of the first commentators of Śaṅkarācārya, largely draws on the *M* in his *Pañcapādikā* "The five Sections."[219] In the first *varṇaka,* a discussion arises between a *Vedāntin* and a *Prābhākara* whose theory of error is rebutted. The second and third *varṇaka* take up, in reference to *athātaḥ brahmaji-*

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[215] A list of these *nyāyas* and their references is provided by Kane 1977²: 1339ff. See also Jhā 1964²: 328ff. Their use in the *dharma* field is examined in Moghe 1984.

[216] Given in *MK* 1, 469ff. and commented by Kunjunni Raja 1977³ passim.

[217] These notions need further investigation. On *upādāna,* see K. S. R. Sastri 1937: intr. XLV.

[218] Jhā 1964² and 1978².

[219] See Venkataramiah 1948.

*jñāsā* (*Brahmasūtra* 1, 1, 1), the main arguments put forward by the Mīmāṃsaka in relation to *MS* 1, 1, 1 *(athātaḥ dharmajijñāsā),* particularly the difficult exegesis of the mandate *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ* "One should engage oneself to the memorizing of one's Veda."[220]

B. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (840–900) is in the first place a prominent *naiyāyika,* but, in virtue of his brahmin education,[221] he is fully acquainted with the *M.* In his famous *Nyāyamañjarī,* he quotes repeatedly the *MS,* the *ŚB* and the *ŚV* (*ākṛtivāda* and *abhāvavāda* regarding *pratyakṣa* for example). He knows the Vṛttikāra (§ 11) and even Bhartṛmitra (§ 28). He devotes long developments to such typical *Mīmāṃsā* views as *svataḥprāmāṇya* and *bhāvanā,* in reference to which he disproves either the Prābhākara or the Bhāṭṭa.[222]

C. Vācaspati Miśra (900–980).[223] This famous scholar managed to write comments on different *darśanas.* Two of his treatises are relevant:

1. The *Tattvabindu* "The Drop of Truth"[224] tries to make clear how a meaning is perceived by the listener from the articulate sounds uttered by the speaker. Emphasis is put less on the word as the tool of conveying this meaning than as a sounding frame. In contrast to MM (§ 48d), the *sphoṭa* theory is explained away, and in accordance with the *Mīmāṃsā* teaching, the ability of the sounds of speech to reveal the meaning without any mediation is affirmed. The argument then goes on with the nature of the sentence. The Prābhākara *anvitābhidhāna* is rejected and the Bhāṭṭa *abhihitānvaya* demonstrated with the help of many citations from K.
2. the *Nyāyakaṇikā,* "The Grain of Dialectic" is a commentary on MM's *Vidhiviveka* (§ 48c).[225] In it appears for the first time the distinction between an old and a new school of Prābhākaras.

D. Vimuktātman (ca. 950), in his Advaita treatise *Iṣṭasiddhi* "The Demonstration of the Desirable"[226] deals with the Prābhākara *akhyāti,* along with other theories of error.

§ 55. Pārthasārathi Miśra (PSM) (1050–1120)[227]

He is the most significant commentator of K. The only information we possess

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[220] This mandatory sentence without mention of benefit *(phala),* aim *(prayojana),* or beneficiary *(adhikārin/niyojya)* is scrutinized by K (*ŚV,* ch. 1), ŚN (*Pp,* ch. 1), PSM (*Nyāyaratnamālā,* see § 57) and so on.

[221] His father (Gurumatācārya) Candra was a Prābhākara, the author of a *Nayakaratnākara* (on the *MS*) and an *Amṛtabindu.* See also below n. 300.

[222] GUPTA 1963: 20–21, 88–89.

[223] The problem of his age is not definitively settled. Sometimes he is considered to be earlier.

[224] Ed. BIARDEAU 1956.

[225] See TAILANGA 1907². Some epistemological sections of the work are translated by Th. STCHERTBATSKI, *Buddhist Logic* II. It was commented upon by Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara in the *Svaditaṅkaraṇī.*

[226] Ed. M. HIRIYANNA 1933, Baroda, Gaekwad's Oriental Series LXV; see also SCHMITHAUSEN 1965: 261ff.

[227] MISHRA 1964²: 35ff.; some scholars think that PSM is a contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra; others situate him circa 1300.

about him, according to an acknowledgment at the end of the *Nyāyaratnamālā*, is that he learnt the *śāstra* under the guidance of his father Yajñātman.

He wrote 1. two voluminous commentaries: the *Nyāyaratnākara*, "The Treasure of the Dialectic" which elucidates the *ŚV* of K (§§ 30ff.),[228] and the *Tantraratna* "The Treasure of the Doctrine" on the *Ṭuptīkā*,[229] 2. one semi-independent treatise: the *Śāstradīpikā* "The Elucidating of the Teaching" on the whole work of K,[230] 3. one independent treatise: the *Nyāyaratnamālā* "The Wreath of the Jewels of Dialectic" in seven chapters.[231]

§ 56. The *Nyāyaratnamālā*

It is a standard *Mīmāṃsā* work, a Bhāṭṭa counterpart and a sweeping disproof of the *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (§ 52) as well as of all the misinterpreters of K.[232]

In chapter 1 *(Prayuktitilaka)*, it is questioned whether the memorizing of the Veda *(adhyayana)* is ancillary to the understanding of the sense (*bhāṭṭa* view) or to the wish of becoming an *ācārya* through instruction *(adhyāpana) (prābhākara* view). Here are a few lines on that point:

> "For if the memorizing were brought into play *(prayukta)* by the injunction of teaching, would then the accomplishment of this (teaching) possibly be incentive *(prayojana)* of the (memorizing), or would the understanding of the Vedic sense be (this incentive)? But that (memorizing) is not brought into play by the (teaching injunction), since the bringing into play is made possible by a proper injunction only.
>
> (Kārikā 11) Since every agent of ancillariness is precluded because of the absence of a mandated person (in *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ*), the same occurs in reference to the teaching, since there is no (mandated person = *niyojya*) either mentioned explicitly in it *(aṣṭavarṣaṃ brāhmaṇam upanayīta/tam adhyāpāyīta, Pāraskara-gṛhyasūtra* 2, 1, 1) ... If somebody, longing for preceptorship *(ācāryaka)*, though not explicitly stated, is presumed to be the mandated person in the injunction of teaching, the same presumption (is admissible) about somebody longing for understanding of the sense of the Veda in the injunction concerning the memorizing.
>
> (Objection). Somebody longing for understanding the sense of the Veda cannot be the mandated person ... It is answered: 'Ah well! you are ready to delude yourself, your pupils and everybody! For how is it possible to rule out the desire for understanding the sense (of the Veda), without deluding your own self *(ātman)* walking along a weary path, full of desire to

[228] Ed. D. Sastri 1978.

[229] Ed. G. S. Nene 1930–1933.

[230] Edd. A. S. Sastri 1978 and P. N. P. Sastri 1978–1981. Translation of the *Tarkapāda* portion by D. Venkaramiah 1940. The *ŚD* was repeatedly commented upon. The first but incomplete commentary (on the *Tarkapāda* only) is the *Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī* (or *Siddhāntacandrikā*) by Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa (ca. 1500) edited by L. S. Dravida 1916, Chowkhamba Skr Ser. 43. Later on, we find the *Mayūkhāvalī* of Appayadīkṣita (16th c.), edited by P. P. Subrahmanya Sastri 1948, Madras Government Or. Ser. 8; the commentaries of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (born in 1513), of his son Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa (*Prakāśa*, second half of the 16th c.) and of the grandson of the latter Dinakara Bhaṭṭa (1700–1750); finally those of Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa (1700–1750), Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita *(Karpūravārttika)*, Somanātha Dīkṣita *(Mayūkhamālikā*, ed. Dharmadatta Jhā, Bombay 1915) and Yajñanārāyaṇa Dīkṣita *(Prabhāmaṇḍala)*, all of them composed in the mid-17th c.

[231] Ed. A. S. S(h)astri 1982. It may be the earliest treatise of PSM, being quoted in all the others.

[232] Summary in K. S. R. Sastri 1937: introduction.

know whether or not there are on it robbers, creeping animals, thorns, beasts of prey, tigers and lions, having eyes moving here and there; your pupils rushing to you, full of curiosity about the sense of the Veda; everybody else who, in view of his desire to know whether or not bliss and so on exist, is looking at each inner place and is keen on listening to instruction and scrutinizing books in order to learn every Vedic subject ..." (text in A. S. SASTRI 1982: 7–8).

In comparison with other texts on the same topic, this one is particularly lucid; moreover, from its second part comes out a touch of enthusiasm and imagination which enlivens the account, two qualities that precisely make PSM a prominent Mīmāṃsaka.[233]

Ch. 2 *(Svataḥprāmāṇyanirṇaya)* on the question of the "intrinsic validity" of knowledge (§ 31).

Ch. 3 *(Vidhinirṇaya)* about the *vidhi* or "injunction."

Ch. 4 *(Vyāptivāda)* on the logical "invariable concomitance" probans-probandum. It is worth noting that PSM uses, to term this, the word *niyama* rather than *vyāpti* itself.[234]

Ch. 5 *(Vākyārthanirṇaya)* is a piece of philosophical grammar dealing with the nature of word and sentence. PSM asserts that a word expresses its meaning directly through a primary significative potency *(abhidhā)*, while Vācaspati Miśra, for instance, is prepared to admit that the word fulfils this task with the help of memory.[235] On the other hand, the syntactically unified meaning *(vākya)* is conveyed through *lakṣaṇā* "secondary (significative) power."[236]

Ch. 6 *(Nityakāmyaviveka)* is a technical discussion on the obligatory and optional rites.

Ch. 7 *(Aṅganirṇaya)*, in five subsections, is devoted to the ritual couple *aṅga-pradhāna* "subsidiary-main elements," i.e. the whole subject of chapters 3 to 12 of *MS-ŚB*.

§ 57. Minor Mīmāṃsakas from 1050 up to 1150

Sucarita Miśra and Someśvara have been referred to § 50. In this span of time, we meet also

1. Paritoṣa Miśra (12th c.?). Work: *Ajitā*[237] or *Tantravārttikanibandhana* on the *TV*, commented upon by Anantanārāyaṇa Miśra (14th c.) in the *Vijaya*.
2. Bhavadeva (ca. 1100). Work: *Tautātitamatatilaka* "The frontal Ornament of Tutātita's Doctrine," Tutātita being a pet name of K.[238] It goes without saying that Bhavadeva denies Prabhākara's ideas.

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[233] PSM may happen to fail to explain his model, see FRAUWALLNER 1938: 247 regarding *Śāstradīpikā* on *MS-ŚB-ŚV* 2, 1, 1. Elsewhere he is untrue to K, D'SA 1980: 119.

[234] See § 36 n. 141; BHATT 1962: 226–227; on his doctrine of the universal-particular relation, see DRAVID 1972: 59–62 and so on.

[235] KUNJUNNI RAJA 1977³: 206.

[236] KUNJUNNI RAJA 1977³: 218; CARDONA 1983: 148ff.

[237] Ed. K. HARIKAI 1983ff. The publisher thinks that there are some distinctive positions in the *Ajitā* and *Nyāyasudhā* (§ 50B).

[238] Ed. A. C. SASTRI–P. SASTRI 1939–1944. Extracts in *MK* passim. See also MISHRA 1964²: 42 and HARIKAI 1985/3: 5ff.

3. Bhavanātha Miśra, probably a younger contemporary of PSM. Work: *Nayaviveka* "The Discrimination of the Conduct," in which he introduces himself as a Prābhākara. This work is a direct interpretation of the *MS,* and was itself repeatedly commented upon.[239]

§ 58. Minor Mīmāṃsakas from 1150 up to 1600[240]

1. Murāri Miśra I (1150–1220) is believed to have founded a third school of *M.* Only two short fragments of his commentary on *MS-ŚB:* the *Tripādinītinayana* and *Ekādaśādyadhikaraṇa,* have been published so far.[241]
2. Halāyudha Bhaṭṭa (late 12th c.), a Bengali pandit. Work: *Śāstrasarvasva.*[242]
3. Dāmodara (1200?) is a Prābhākara. Work: *Tarkārṇava* or *Prameyaparāyaṇa.*[243]
4. Cidānanda Paṇḍita (13th c.). Work: *Nītitattvāvirbhāva,*[244] which became the pattern for the *Mānameyodaya* (§ 62).
5. Nandīśvara (1220–1300) is a Prābhākara. Work: *Prabhākaravijaya.*[245]
6. Gāṅgādhara Miśra (1230–1300). Work: *Nyāyapārāyaṇa* on K's *TV.*
7. Vedāntadeśika (alias Veṅkaṭanātha) (between 1269 and 1369). Works: *Mīmāṃsāpādukā* and *Seśvaramīmāṃsā.*[246]
8. Kṣīrasamudra-vāsin (or °-miśra) (1400?). Works: *Arthavādādivicāra;*[247] *Dīpa* on the *ŚB.*
9. Bhaṭṭa Viṣṇu/Viṣṇu Bhaṭṭa (14th c.) is a Prābhākara. Work: *Nayatattvasaṃgraha.*[248]
10. Indrapati Ṭhakkura (ca. 1450). Work: *Mīmāṃsāsārapallava.*
11. Govinda Ṭhakkura (born in 1478). Work: *Adhikaraṇamālā.*
12. Devanātha Ṭhakkura (ca. 1550). Work: *Adhikaraṇakaumudī,*[249] also attributed to Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa (§ 55 note 230).
13. Raghunātha Bhaṭṭācārya (16th c.). Work: *Mīmāṃsāratna.*
14. Aṉṉaṃbhaṭṭa (16th c.), Naiyāyika, author of the well-known *Tarkasaṃgraha,* wrote, in the *Mīmāṃsā* area, the *Subodhinī* on the *TV* and the *Rāṇakaphakkikavyākhyā* or *Rāṇakojjivinī* on the *Nyāyasudhā* (§ 50B).

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[239] Ed. S. K. R. Sastri 1937. See also Mishra 1964²: 40–41.

[240] About them, see Mishra 1964²: 41ff. Some of them, albeit important, are here looked at as minor either because their work is still unpublished (Murāri), or because their main contributions are made to other schools of thought.

[241] By S. K. R. Sastri, Journal of Oriental Research 2 (1928) and 5, supplement. On Mu in general see Mishra 1964², 20–21; J. Mohanty, Gaṅgesa's Theory of Truth ..., Santiniketan 1966: Intr. p. 11.

[242] Ed. U. Mishra, Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society (Patna), 17–18 (1931–1932).

[243] Analysis by V. A. Ramaswami Sastri, Proc. of the All India Oriental Conference 16, summaries, 1951, 217ff.

[244] Ed. P. K. N. Sastri, Trivandrum Skt. Ser. 168, 1953.

[245] Ed. N. S. A. Sastri–S. K. R. Sastri, Skt. Sahitya Parishad Ser. 11, Calcutta 1926.

[246] Ed. G. Krishnacharya Svami, Madras 1940.

[247] Ed. T. A. Venkateśvara Dikshitar, Bhāratīya Vidyā Ser. 14, Bombay 1951.

[248] Ed. T. Ghandasekharan, Bull. of the Gov. Oriental Manuscript Library 15, Madras 1962.

[249] Ed. N. S. Khiste–V. S. Varekale, Kashi Skt. Ser. 50, 1926.

15. Varadarāja (16th c.? fl. 1250 according to POTTER 1983[2]: 270) is a Prābhākara. Work: *(Artha-)dīpikā* on Bhavanātha's *Nayaviveka* (§ 57).
16. Appayadīkṣita (16th c.) is a polymath who wrote, in the *Mīmāṃsā* area, the *Vidhirasāyaṇa* in verses, with an auto-commentary *(Vivekasukhopayoginī)*[250] and the *Citrapaṭa* or *Laghuvārttika.*[251]
17. Vijayīndratīrtha (1514–1595). Works: *Nyāyādhvadīpikā; Mīmāṃsānaya-kaumudī.*
18. Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa I (2nd half of the 16th c.). Works: *Mīmāṃsābālaprakāśa* where are enlisted in a rather pedantic way the numerous varieties of a notion (*vidhi, apūrva* and so on);[252] *Mīmāṃsāsārasaṃgraha* (250 verses),[253] *Vidhirasāyaṇadūṣa-ṇa,* refutation *(dūṣaṇa)* of the work of Appayadīkṣita quoted above (n° 16).
19. Rāmānujācārya (between 1350 and 1600 according to K. S. R. SASTRI 1937: intr. LVIII; fl. 1750, POTTER 1983[2]: 465). Works: *Nayakaratna* on PSM's *Nyāyarat-namālā;*[254] *Tantrarahasya* dealing with *māna* and *meya* in the *Prābhākara* line and quoting almost forgotten *Prābhākara* works.[255]

§ 59. Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya (mid-14th. c.)

Two questions regarding this personality still remain unanswered: is M-V the same person as Sāyaṇa, the famous commentator of the Vedic literature (*Ṛgveda* and so on), or is he his brother? Is Vidyāraṇya, the author of the *Pañcadaśī* etc., to be identified with M-V? Whatever the replies can be,[256] we possess under the name of M-V three relevant works:

A. the *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara*[257] "The long Wreath of Jaimini's Rules" is a voluminous digest of the *ŚB,* written to teach the doctrine to the children of Bukkadevaraya, emperor of Vijayanagara (1356–1377).[258]

Each *adhikaraṇa* of the *ŚB* is summed up first by one or several *kārikās* fulfilling their role of *versus memoriales,* and afterwards, by a debate in prose explaining very lucidly the issue adumbrated in the *kārikā.*[259] The views of Guru Prabhākara are taken into account here and there, e.g., in 2, 1, *kār.* 10–11. In the introduction, M-V delineated his program as follows:

"Let the rule *(nyāya = adhikaraṇa)* be summed up, as far as possible, by one, two or several *ślokas.* Anyway, the book summarizing the thousand rules (= the 915 *adhikaraṇas* of

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250 Ed. M. SASTRI, Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. 13, Benares 1901.
251 Ed. T. R. CHINTAMANI, Journal of Oriental Research 8, supplement, Madras 1934.
252 Ed. Mukunda SHASTRI, Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. 16, Benares 1902.
253 Ed. L. S. DRAVIDA, Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. 47, Benares 1904.
254 Ed. A. S. SASTRI 1982 (see bibliography); analysis in K. S. R. SASTRI 1937: Intr. LIXff.
255 Ed. R. SHAMASASTRI–K. S. R. SASTRI, Gaekwad's Or. Ser. 24, 1923, 1956.
256 On these problems which are somewhat neglected today, see after others T. M. P. MAHADEVAN, The Philosophy of Advaita, Madras 1957[2], intr.
257 Ed. GOLDSTÜCKER-COWELL 1970[2].
258 It must be remembered that Mādhava was a minister of this prince.
259 Portions of the *JNMV* are quoted throughout Sāyaṇa's commentaries on the *Taittirīya-saṃhitā* and *brāhmaṇa.* On the other hand, the exegetical method and vocabulary of this same Sāyaṇa are indebted to the *M,* see MOGHE 1974–1975.

the *ŚB*)[260] is complete with less than 2000 *ślokas*. It does not extend further. Because of the numerous comments on the *Bhāṣya* and so on and because of their inaccessibility, the *M* was previously like an ocean. The present book being composed without these two defects and made for the enjoyment of the young royal sons, the *M* will not become similar to a pond with water up to the navel (where playing is dangerous). Even if the summarizing *śloka* occurs in the *Śāstradīpikā*, it is not extant everywhere in it ..." (the text in GOLDSTÜCKER-COWELL 1970[2]: 4).

B. the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* "The Compendium of all the Viewpoints" is very popular.[261] Out of the 15 chapters, the twelfth exposes the doctrine of the *M*, or rather a few of its preliminary tenets: Why is the *M* to be taught? What is the *apauruṣeyatva?* What is the nature of the phonemes? Why is *svataḥprāmāṇya* to be admitted? There are incidental references to Pr. Generally speaking, this chapter requires a thorough knowledge of the *M* to be properly understood.

C. the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*, "The universal Conquest of Śaṅkara" is apocryphal.[262] This mythical biography of Śaṅkara provides us with information about his opponents and, among them, the Mīmāṃsakas.

§ 60. Minor Mīmāṃsakas from 1600 up to 1900[263]

1. Govinda Bhaṭṭa (early 17th c.). Work: *(Bhāṭṭarka* or) *Mīmāṃsānyāyasaṃgraha.*
2. Kamalākara (pet name Dādu Bhaṭṭa) (1700–1750). Works: *Bhavārtha* on the *TV* against the *Nyāyasudhā* (§ 50B); *Śāstramālā* on the *MS; Siddhāntatattvaviveka.*[264]
3. Ananta Bhaṭṭa (17th c., son of n° 2). Works: *Nyāyarahasya; Sadācārarahasya; Jyotsnā*, a *vṛtti* on his father's *Śāstramālā.*
4. Viśveśvara (pet name Gāga Bhaṭṭa) (mid-17th c.). Works: *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi;*[265] *Kusumāñjali* on the *MS; Śivārkodaya* that is styled the continuation in verses of the *ŚV.*
5. Anantadeva (mid-17th c.), son of Āpadeva (§ 61B). Works: *Bhāṭṭālaṃkara* on his father's *Āpadevī; Phalasāṃkaryakhaṇḍana; Smṛtikauṣṭubha* that applies the *M* to the *Dharmaśāstra.*[266]
6. Jīvadeva (brother of n° 5). Work: *Bhāṭṭabhāskara* (also attributed to Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa II, early 17th c.).
7. Koṇḍadeva (17th c.). Work: *Bhāṭṭamatapradīpikā.*
8. Murāri Miśra II (mid-17th c.). Work: *Aṅgatvanirukti* on the *TV.*[267]

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[260] The expression seems to be ancient, if at least we are entitled to recognize it in an inscription of Pulakeśin II (616 A. D.) that uses the word *sahasratarkakāya*, SANKARANARAYANAN 1981: 15; of the same author, The Vishnukundis and their Time, Delhi 1977, p. 196, line 28.

[261] Ed. V. S. ABHYANKAR 1951[2]; English tr. COWELL-GOUGH 1961[6].

[262] Ed. DHANAPATISŪRI 1915[2]. There is another *Śaṅkaṛavijaya* by Ānandagiri, S. K. R. SASTRI 1971[2]: Intr. VII ff.

[263] Further information on them in MISHRA 1964[2]: 51ff. For Khaṇḍadeva Miśra and others, see § 64.

[264] Ed. Sudhakara DUBE, Benares Skt. Ser. 1, 1885.

[265] Ed. R. S. PATAVARDHANA, Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. 6, 1900–1933.

[266] Ed. Vasudev Laksman Sastri PANSIKAR, Bombay, Nirnaya Sagara, 1909.

[267] Ed. G. Y. RAO, Anandāśrama Skt. Ser. 97, 1973.

9. Veṅkaṭādhvarin (mid-17th c.). Works: *Vidhitrayapuritrāṇa* on the kinds of injunction; *Mīmāṃsāmakaranda.*
10. Gopāla Bhaṭṭa II (17th c.). Works: *Mīmāṃsāvidhibhūṣaṇa; Mīmāṃsātattvacandrikā.*
11. Rāghavendra Yati (17th c.). Work: *Bhāṭṭasaṃgraha* on the *MS.*
12. (Kavimaṇḍana) Śambhubhaṭṭa (1640–1708). Works: *Prabhāvalī* on the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* of Khaṇḍadeva;[268] *Pūrvamīmāṃsādhikaraṇasaṃkṣepa.*
13. Bhāskararāya (or Bhāskarānanda, early 18th c.). Works: *Candrikā* on four chapters of the *Saṃkarṣakāṇḍa* (§ 9);[269] *Candrodaya* on Khaṇḍadeva's *Bhāṭṭadīpikā; Matvarthalakṣaṇavicāra; Vādakautūhala.*
14. Vāsudeva Dīkṣita (first half of the 18th c.). Work: *Adhvaramīmāṃsākutūhalavṛtti.*[270]
15. Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa (pet name Balaṃbhaṭṭa) (mid-18th c.). Work: *Piṣṭapaśunirnaya.*
16. (Gauḍa) Brahmānanda Sarasvatī (early 18th c.). Work: *Mīmāṃsācandrikā.*
17. Rāghavānanda Sarasvatī (fl. 1620, POTTER 1983[2]: 392; 18th c., MISHRA 1964[2]: 62). Works: *Mīmāṃsāsūtradīdhiti* on the *MS; Mīmāṃsāstāvaka.*
18. Kṛṣṇa Yajvan (mid-18th c.). Work: *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā,* an elementary primer giving in short the entire contents of the *M.*[271]
19. Rāmeśvara (mid-19th c., POTTER 1983[2]: 485). Works: *Subodhinī* on the *MS;*[272] *Kaumudī* on Laugākṣi Bhāskara's *Arthasaṃgraha* (§ 61).[273]

§ 61. Laugākṣi Bhāskara and Āpadeva (17th c.)

A. Laugākṣi Bhāskara was possibly a native of Southern India, and might be prior to Āpadeva who could have drawn upon the *Arthasaṃgraha* for his own work.[274] LB's work, the *Arthasaṃgraha,* "The Compendium of objects (treated of)," is a ritual primer discussing about 50 stock sentences which are commonplace in the debates of the *M,* e.g., *vrīhīn prokṣati* etc. It makes out all the elements that are necessary to understand them but are usually implicit in the works of the earlier Mīmāṃsakas. The topics dealt with are *śābdī-* and *ārthī-bhāvanā, vidhi, mantra, nāmadheya* (§ 20), principles of interpretation (*śruti* etc., § 21) and negative sentences. Here are definitions of four important notions of the late *M* as given in the *AS:*

> "By 'verbal bhāvanā' *(śābdī bh.),* we understand the peculiar activity of some productive agent, which tends to make a person act; it is expressed by the optative element (of words such as *yajeta*) ... In Vedic sentences ... where there is no speaking person, it resides only in the words characterized by optative terminations etc. ...

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268 For the edition, see § 65n.
269 Ed. in Pandit New Ser., voll. XIV–XV.
270 Partial ed. by S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI, Sri Vani Vilas Ser. 1, 1907.
271 Ed. N. R. ACARYA, Bombay 1950.
272 Ed. Nityānanda PANTA, Pandit[2] 1899.
273 Ed. K. N. SASTRI–L. S. PANSIKAR, Bombay 1950[3].
274 MISHRA 1964[2]: 49–50; EDGERTON 1929: Intr. 20–23.

'Actual *bhāvanā' (ārthī bh.)* is to be defined as a peculiar energy (of some person) which refers to some action (e.g., a sacrifice), and is engendered by the desire of some object. This 'actual *bhāvanā*' is – in words like *yajeta* – expressed by that element of the word which denotes the verb ...

By 'action contributing (towards the general result of the sacrifice) through an intermediate step' *(saṃnipatyupakāraka)* we understand an action enjoined with reference to some substance etc., the latter being itself subsidiary to some action. Of this kind is for instance the beating of the rice-grains ... By 'action contributing (towards the general result) directly' *(ārādup.)* we understand an action which is merely enjoined, without reference to any substance etc. As for instance the *prayāja* etc." (tr. THIBAUT 1974[2]: 20–21).

B. Āpadeva. He came from a family of Maratha brahmins. His father and his son, both of them called Anantadeva, were experts in *M.*[275] The latter (§ 60, n° 5) even commented upon Āpadeva's work, the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* "Explanation of the Mīmāṃsā rules" or *Āpadevī.* In this treatise, Āpadeva does not claim originality. He merely wants to give a simple and complete account of the technical background of the system, that is 1. the five divisions of the Veda: *vidhi, mantra, nāmadheya,* negative sentences *(niṣedha* and *paryudāsa), arthavāda,* 2. the means of interpretation (*śruti* etc., § 21), 3. extra considerations on *apūrva, śābdī-* and *ārthībhāvanā.*

Thus the *Āpadevī* deals with the same matters as the *Arthasaṃgraha,* within the same framework, with even passages copied out verbatim, but it discusses nearly four times more stock sentences than the latter work.[276] Āpadeva quotes Jaimini more frequently than Ś. But above all he is a faithful Bhāṭṭa (citing K's *kārikās*) and a follower of PSM, making his master a *siddhāntin* opposed to Someśvara (§ 50B) as *pūrvapakṣin.*

The prose of ĀP is technical and abstract but generally plain. It is full of definitions, but devoid of philosophical interest as well as of literary ornament. Some of these features appear in the following extracts, the first of which explains why a *viśiṣṭavidhi (somena yajeta)* is exceptionally able to ordain two things:

"Thus in the injunction 'He shall sacrifice with *soma,*' since neither the sacrifice (itself) nor *soma* (its material) have been established (otherwise), we have an injunction of a sacrifice particularized by *soma;* it means 'He shall effect the desired end by means of a sacrifice of *soma.*' And there is no split of sentence (*vākyabheda,* § 22) in the injunction of both these things, because the thing particularized (by its accessories) is really a unit (not two separate things are enjoined, but one which is described by one of its qualities). And in a particularized injunction, there is (necessarily made) an implication of possessive indication; thus (in the sentence just quoted) the word *soma* implies possessive indication *(matvarthalakṣaṇa);* it means '(a sacrifice) having (= characterized by) *soma*' ..." (tr. EDGERTON 1929: §§ 12–13).

The second passage evolves a distinction between two types of negative sentences:

"Others say: 'restriction *(upasaṃhāra)* consists in the limitation to a special case of something established in general, and so means particularizing of the injunction. But according to

[275] Āpadeva refers once to his father in opposing a view held by Someśvara, EDGERTON 1929: Intr. 23.

[276] Most of them can be traced to the texts of the *Taittirīya* school.

the statement of the authority quoted (Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*), that 'Exclusion *(paryudāsa)* is to be understood where the negative is taken with another word (than the verbal ending),' exclusion means combining the negative with something other than the ending, whether the verbal root, or a noun" (tr. quoted, § 353).

§ 62. Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa of Malabar (1587–1656) and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita (ca. 1650)

Each of them has written one part of the *Mānameyodaya,* "The Elucidation of the Means and Categories (of valid knowledge)."[277] They adopt *Bhāṭṭa* positions and refute the *Prābhākara* and *Bauddha* systems as well as *Nyāya and Advaita.* The *Mm,* a mixture of *ślokas* and prose, appears to be a summary of Cidānanda's *Nītitattvāvirbhāva* (§ 58, n° 4).

After an introduction on the valid knowledge, NB reviews the classical *pramāṇas,* viz. perception, inference, verbal testimony, identification, presumption, non-apprehension of existence. NP, who worked out the second part of the book at the request of Mānaveda, King of Calicut (1655–1658), deals with the categories (of *Vaiśeṣika* origin): substance *(dravya,* including views on *ātman, mokṣa, śabda* and *sphoṭa),* genus *(jāti),* quality *(guṇa),* action *(karma),* non-existence (*abhāva* as a category with a survey of the Buddhist approach).

The following passage (part I, ch. 2 = *anumāna,* §§ 4–5) is a short account of the relationship word-sentence, which might be a paraphrase of *ŚB* 1, 1, 25:

"... Since the words are exhausted with conveying the sense of the words, and are also remote, it is only the sense of the words that conveys the meaning of the sentence, which is in the form of a relation among themselves. 5. (*Prābhākara* view) ... Therefore, here, the meanings of the words, which are understood from the words, afterwards enter into mutual relation ..." (tr. KUNHAN RAJA-SASTRI 1975[2]: 95–97).

The necessity of passing through the meanings to build up a sentence proceeds from the fact that the words by themselves are isolated. As a sentence represents a relationship, this extra element can be produced by the meanings.

§ 63. *M* and *Dharmaśāstra*

The interpretative principles evolved and applied by the *M* to the body of the Vedic ritualistic statements could easily be used in the case of a legal corpus such as the *Smṛti* and *Dharmaśāstra.* By taking up the *Mīmāṃsā* devices for removing apparent contradictions and solving knotty points in the texts, the legal experts achieved for this doctrine a real survival in the area of secular law.[278]

Commenting upon *MS* 1, 3, 1–23, Ś had already evaluated the importance of the traditional rules of *smṛti* and popular customs *(ācāra)* in comparison with the holy law of the Veda.[279] Several *adhikaraṇas* of his *Bhāṣya* contain debates intimated by their

[277] Ed. (with an English translation) KUNHAN RAJA-SASTRI 1975[2].

[278] KEITH 1921, ch. VI; LINGAT 1967: 170. The classical treatise on the topic is K. L. SARKAR, The Mīmāṃsā Rules of interpretation as applied to Hindu Law, Calcutta 1909. See also P. S. SANE, Practical Use of Mīmāṃsā Rules in the field of Dharmaśāstra, Bhāratīya Vidyā XXXIX 1979.

[279] This part of the *ŚB* has been studied at length by KANE 1973[2]: 828ff. and 1977[2]: 1256ff., who was keen on showing the relationship between the two fields. See § 37 for a view of K.

titles. These became the *nyāyas* or "maxims" alluded to in many subsequent discussions in different areas. *MS-ŚB* 3, 1, 13–15 is thus well known as the *grahanyāya* or "cup rule,"[280] and seeks to demonstrate that the singular number includes the plural; *MS-ŚB* 6, 1, 6–16, while teaching that the wife is also entitled to sacrifice, reminds us thereby of the Latin juridical maxim *"genus masculinum complectitur et femininum."*[281] The requirement of consistency between the words of a sentence *(ekavākyatānyāya),* emphasized by the *M,* is also adopted by the Dharmaśāstrin.[282] The concepts of *ānarthakya* "meaninglessness" and *vākyabheda* (§ 22) are common to both disciplines.[283] The *M* had laid down that a phrase connected with the previous one by *hi,* viz. an *arthavāda,* was only praise and by no means the utterance of a cause, and that, in order to keep the injunction *(vidhi),* unjustified and therefore totally compulsory. When the legal commentators scrutinize the rule XV, 3 in the *Vasiṣṭha-dharmasūtra,* forbidding that an only son be given or taken in adoption, they do the same because the taking into account of the *hi*-phrase would weaken the strength of the prohibition and make it ad libitum.[284] Such a puzzling way of interpretation occurs elsewhere also, e.g., in the evaluation of the respective importance of the visible and invisible *(dṛṣṭārtha* and *a-°)* purposes of the deeds. If the former can be discovered, it is preferably to be admitted. But if not, the latter should necessarily be laid down, because injunction and prohibition must have an aim. But at this point, the invisible purpose must be respected still more carefully than the visible, because it plunges its roots in the sacral. For instance, if a man marries a girl affected by an illness, he will be the first to be harmed. But if the girl belongs to a forbidden degree of kindred, the man marrying her commits a sin, because he violates a purely spiritual prescription. So he is more guilty in this case than in the first one. Such a reasoning could not be without consequence in the legal field, and modern courts have bothered about stating their views on it.[285]

§ 64. *M* and *Navya-nyāya (Nn)*

From the 13th century onwards, and in the same area (Mithilā-Tirhut) which had been the homeland of so many Mīmāṃsakas, arises the new school of logic named *Navya-nyāya.* It was inevitable that both trends of thought came to touch.[286] That already occurs in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi,* the epoch-making treatise of Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the *Nn.*[287] Therein we find mention of a certain Murāri, undoubtedly a

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[280] LINGAT 1967: 171ff. See also § 52 note 215.

[281] LINGAT 1967: 172; KANE 1977²: 1285–1286.

[282] KANE 1973²: 443.

[283] EDGERTON 1929, intr. 3; KANE 1977²: 1299ff.

[284] LINGAT 1967: 174–175; KANE 1973²: 674–676.

[285] LINGAT 1967: 175ff.; KANE 1973²: 837–838; MOGHE 1984: 129–130 and 113 for the juridical import of the maxim *śāstraphalam prayoktari.*

[286] Some *Navyanyāya* concepts, such as *abhāva* are anticipated in the *ŚV,* ch. 17, TRIPATHI 1977: 347; DIXIT 1983: 14.

[287] Analysis in VIDYABHUSANA 1971²: 405ff. A guide of the work in POTTER, first ed. (1970) of the *Encyclopedia,* I, 219ff. (but not in 1983²).

Mīmāṃsaka,[288] and primarily, of a Sondāl/ḍa (or Sauṇḍaḍa, 1200?) of whom we know nothing but a theory of logic. It undergoes the onslaughts of Gaṅgeśa,[289] and reads as follows: in the *anumāna,* the invariable concomitance *(vyāpti)* must be partly strengthened by a negative example, i.e. that of a constant absence. But in some cases, e.g., in the statement "all (entities) are nameable because they are knowable," no negative example is to be found. And Sondāla precisely invented the notion of *vyadhikaraṇābhāva* "absence of non-concurrent (property)," with an eye on dealing with exclusively positive statements.[290] But Gaṅgeśa rejected it as inconsistent.

In opposition to the Mīmāṃsakas (mainly Prābhākara), who were the substitutes for the Buddhists at a time when these had disappeared from India, Gaṅgeśa defines his own theory of knowledge, his views about presumption *(arthāpatti),* similarity *(sādṛśya)* and so on.[291] In the fourth and last book of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi,* he opposes the view that the Veda is eternal and evolves his conception of *vidhi* and *apūrva.*[292]

Let us end up with a number of thinkers who were both Mīmāṃsaka and Navya-naiyāyika or were influenced by the *Nn.*

1. Khaṇḍadeva Miśra (alias Śrīdharendra) (mid-17th c.), Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsaka. Works: *Mīmāṃsākaustubha,*[293] *Bhāṭṭadīpikā,*[294] *Bhāṭṭarahasya,*[295] where the method resembles that of the Neo-logician Gadādhara in the *Vyutpattivāda.*
2. Rājacūḍāmaṇimakhin/mallin/dīkṣita (1580–1650). Works: *Tantraśikhāmaṇi* on the *ŚB; Saṃkarṣanyāyamuktāvalī* (§ 9); *Karpūravārttika* on the *Śāstradīpikā; Darpaṇa* on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi.*
3. Rāmakṛṣṇadīkṣita/adhvārin (late 17th c.). Works: *Mīmāṃsānyāyadarpaṇa; Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi* on Rucidatta's *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa.*
4. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya (1604–1709?). Works: *Gādādharī* on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti; Vidhisvarūpavicāra.*[296]
5. (Tatsat) Vaidyanātha (ca. 1700). Works: *Nyāyabindu;*[297] two *Prabhā,* one on the *MS-ŚB,* the second on the *Śāstradīpikā;*[298] commentary upon Rucidatta's *Tattvacintāmaṇiprakāśa.*

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288 MOHANTY 1966 (quoted n. 241): 10ff.

289 And his successors, especially Vāsudeva, see the paper quoted in the next note.

290 G. BHATTACHARYA, *Vyadhikaraṇābhāva – A Type of Negation,* Wiener Zeitschrift f. d. Kunde Südasiens, Vienna 1975, XIX, 199ff.

291 VIDYABHUSANA 1971²: 435.

292 VIDYABHUSANA 1971²: 448–449.

293 Ed. A. Chinnasvami SASTRI–Pattabhirama SASTRI 1924–1933, Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. 58.

294 Last ed. by S. S. S. SASTRI 1952, Madras Un. Skt. Ser. 19 (with Śambhubhaṭṭa's *Prabhāvalī*). Important extracts in *MK.*

295 Ed. A. S. SASTRI, Benares 1970.

296 Ed. Yadavendranath RAY 1973, Calcutta; tr. MADHAVANANDA, Howrah 1948.

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298 Ed. of the first *Prabhā* by K. V. ABHYANKAR and G. A. Jośī in the first vol. of the *Mīmāṃsādarśanam,* Poona 1976⁴, Ānandāśrama Skt. Ser. 97; ed. of the second one by P. N. P. SASTRI 1978.

6. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (late 17th c.). Works: *Bhāṭṭabhāṣāprakāśa;*[299] commentary upon Raghunātha's *Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti.*

We should add to the list the name of Candra whose work is still unpublished, but who is the author of a brief *Amṛtabindu* in which he quotes ancient *Mīmāṃsā* authorities (Mahāvrata, Mahodadhi etc.). Candra is also referred to by Gaṅgeśa.[300]

§ 65. The *M* in the 20th century

It is difficult to evaluate the present-day importance of the *M* in India.[301] Here we limit ourselves to present briefly three prominent scholars of this century who contributed to allot to the *M* its right place in the Indian philosophical landscape and to foster the revival of its study. These are Gaṅgānātha Jhā, Pandurang Vaman Kane and Marathe Narayan Sadashiv alias Kevalānandasaraswatī.

1. Gaṅgānātha Jhā (1887–1941)[302] was born near Darbhaṅga (Mithilā). He was an indefatigable translator of the *MS, ŚB, ŚV* and *TV,* and he is the first to have focused attention on the work of Prabhākara,[303] unpublished in his time. He was not only an extraordinary translator of these texts crowded with difficulties; he also commented upon them thanks to the traditional lore of his brahmin education, and he moreover published some of them, e.g. the *Bhāvanāviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra.
2. The approach of P. V. Kane (1880–1972) is different. As a jurist, he was keen on scrutinizing the influence of the old *Mīmāṃsā* principles on the modern Hindu law. His famous "History of Dharmaśāstra"[304] contains, in the third and fifth volumes, scores of pages on this subject, and refers to the court cases that were settled with the help of *Mīmāṃsā* rules. His encyclopaedic knowledge of the Sanskrit literature and his didactical skill managed to enliven these stern questions.
3. Kevalānandasaraswatī (1877–1955), after having studied the Veda and the *darśanas* (with an emphasis on *Vedānta* and *Navyanyāya*), founded in 1916 at Wai the "Prajña Pathashala." He began the *Mīmāṃsākoṣa* in 1944 and completed it in 1954, compiling its seven parts alone. This stupendous work supplies us with the main texts of the *M* in the alphabetical order of the titles of the *MS.* It brings together passages dealing with technical notions and, besides, contains the author's personal considerations and summaries of the problems.[305]

§ 66. Conclusion

The fate of the *M* is a paradoxical one. As early as Ś, the doctrine appears as a complete body the main task of which remains the examination of the sentences of the

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299 Ed. Bhagavat Ācārya 1900, Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. 4.

300 D. Bhattacharya 1958: 32ff. Is he the Candra quoted above n. 221?

301 Some people pretend that it dwindles into oblivion.

302 Mishra 1964²: 64–65.

303 See Jhā 1978².

304 See bibliography s. v. Kane. At the end of the fifth volume, Kane has written his autobiography. The contribution of Kane to the *M* is evaluated by Moghe 1984: ch. 21.

305 Information kindly supplied by Pandit L. Joshi, Chairman of the Maharashtra State

Veda, but which continuously verges on logical and epistemological analysis. Sheer exegesis might have prevailed but actually it did not, and in a second stage with K and Pr the *darśana* turns into a genuine speculative research with a strong grammatical and linguistic bias. However, it never gives up seeking similes and examples in its old ritual background.

Another baffling aspect is the mixture of apparently contradictory tendencies. The *M* is indeed a realism, but it puts in the centre of its thought the Vedic injunction, the outcome of which is beyond the range of perception. To reconcile both sides, the *M* argues that, before looking for the help of the Veda in order to lay down something, we must use the other means of knowledge *(pramāṇāntara)*.

The *M* claims to follow a strict method of explanation, but when it ends in a stalemate, it resorts to the argument of authority ("There is nothing that cannot be done by a direct – i.e. Vedic – declaration").[306] Hence a certain amount of arbitrariness.

Paradoxical too is the fact that the *M* developed among polemics with Buddhism, but when this disappeared from India, the *M* took up its part and became the target of attacks specially led by *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika*.

The occidental and modern reader, acquainted in general with scientific thought, is puzzled by the emphasis placed in the *M* upon the concept of final cause (*artha* "goal," *prayojaka* "incentive"); by a bias towards negative phraseology; and, last but not least, by the great number of implicit factors in the discussion and the ambiguity of some others. For example, who could ascertain in each case the value of *sa/ta*- isolated or in composition? Whatever it be, the *M* has been and still is a first-rate tool of dialectic skill,[307] that described by Kṛṣṇamiśra (14th c.), when he spoke of the *M* as "endowed with multitudes of arms which are thousands of dazzling reasonments" (*Prabodhacandrodaya,* act V, stanza 7).


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[306] See e.g., *ŚB* on *MS* 6, 1, 44: *na hi vacanasya kiṃ cid alabhyam nāma* (the text in *MK* 6, 3285b, 28; tr. JHĀ 1973–1974[2]: 1008).

[307] Even if it applies to idle problems (according to a modern and occidental point of view) such as: in a word repetition, is the same group of phonemes repeated many times or are there many different groups of phonemes?

§ 67. Chart[308]




[308] Another chart in A. S. Sastri 1961: int. 22–23.

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VIṢṆUBHAṬṬA = BHAṬṬAVIṢṆU.
VIŚVEŚVARA, § 60.

F. ZANGENBERG 1962, Śabaraḥ und seine Philosophischen Quellen, Wiener Zeitschrift f. d. Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens VI, pp. 60ff.

[Addendum. The book by M. HATTORI, Dignāga, On Perception, Harvard Or. Series 47, belongs to Buddhist studies, but contains the translation of ch. I of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* where the Mīmāṃsakas are attacked and which was again criticized by K. Hattori's notes are extremely useful.]

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